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One of the main goals of memory research is to identify why false memory errors occur.  
Much work has been done in prior research to identify and define false memory processes using 
indirect measurements for them, such as using response latencies to hypothesize how one 
memory process may be faster over another, or inferring how recollecting contextual details of a 
target is affected by the order in which items were presented during encoding.  A weakness in 
these indirect methods of measuring processes is just that: they are indirect measurements.  The 
advantage of memory models is that they provide direct measurements of memory processes, 
allowing researchers to test assumptions about how manipulations affect them, and comparing 
them against each other.  
The theme of this dissertation is to use new models and modeling techniques to answer 
questions that previously relied on indirect methods of identifying processes.  In Experiment 1, a 
new model was created to accommodate two source memory designs used to measure 
overdistribution in episodic memory.  The model was able to provide insight that the two designs 
tapped into different memory processes, and thus were not measuring the same overdistribution 
metric as previously assumed.  In Experiment 2, a new methodology in modeling was 
implemented so that relative process speeds could be measured alongside process parameter 
estimates.  The new latency extension of a widely used recognition model was fit to previously 
collected data, providing a first look into how familiarity may not be the fast process responsible 
for false memory under fast response deadlines as previously believed.  Experiment 3 addressed 
 weaknesses from Experiment 2, and supported its findings that context recollection was faster 
than familiarity.  These experiments demonstrate how memory models provide a simple but 
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It has not always been the case that false memory was something readily accepted as a 
common occurrence.  Indeed, the public attitude that memory is infallible, especially when the 
person remembering them has high confidence in its accuracy, is reflected in how conviction 
outcomes of criminal cases are often dependent on eyewitness testimony (Fisher, 1997). 
However, data show that out of 356 wrongful convictions exonerated through DNA evidence, 
70% of the convictions involved an eyewitness misidentification, suggesting that witnesses not 
only did not accurately remember the perpetrator, but had confidence in their false memory 
(Innocence Project, 2016).  Why do false memory errors occur, and in what situations are they 
likely to appear?  The more we understand memory errors, the more we can identify the 
likelihood that a memory decision is accurate. 
 To answer these two questions, it is first necessary to define what false memory is.  
Traditionally, three types of memory responses have been defined: a.) True memory, where one 
remembers an event exactly as it happened, b.) Forgetting, where one cannot recall anything 
about an event, and c.) False memory, where one remembers details of an event that never 
happened while rejecting true details. Recently, it has been proposed that there is another type of 
memory error called overdistribution.  Whereas false memory is accepting a false detail and 
rejecting a true detail (e.g. remembering the culprit was Caucasian and not Hispanic), 
overdistribution is when a person accepts both the false and true details even in cases where the 
details contradict each other (e.g. remembering the culprit as being both Caucasian and Hispanic) 
(Brainerd, Reyna, Holliday, & Nakamura, 2012).  The way memory is encoded and retrieved 
determine the probability of true memory, forgetting, false memory, and overdistribution, and 
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they are defined by memory theories. 
 One prominent theory that defines these different types of memory responses is fuzzy 
trace theory (FTT; Reyna & Brainerd, 2011).  FTT defines two independent memory traces that 
contribute to true and erroneous memory retrieval; verbatim and gist.  Verbatim traces are the 
surface level features of an experience; for example remembering you had fries for lunch 
because you could remember the texture and color of the fries, and their oily smell.  Because 
verbatim traces are traces that exemplify the event as it had actually happened, they support true 
memory.  Their weakness, however, is that they tend to be prone to interference, and decay 
relatively quickly over time.  Gist traces, on the other hand, are traces that preserve the 
underlying meaning of an event.  In the prior example, you may remember that you had fries for 
lunch because you could remember that you had fast food.  Because gist traces can be consistent 
with many different episodic states of an event (e.g. “fast food” can define both fries and 
burgers), it not only supports true memory (remembering ‘fries’) but also erroneous memory 
(remembering ‘burgers’).  Therefore, while these traces are more robust than verbatim traces, 
they can be relatively error-prone.  
 The strength of FTT is that its simple framework of two independent memory traces can 
not only explain memory phenomena, but also predict them.  For example, it predicts why false 
memory is especially elevated in a widely used false memory paradigm, the Deese-Roediger-
McDermott paradigm (DRM; Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1985).  In this paradigm, 
participants study a list of words where some words are related to each other.  They then take a 
recognition test where they are presented with words that they had previously studied (targets), 
new words that were related to the studied targets (critical distractors), and new words that were 
unrelated to the studied targets (unrelated distractors).  One of the reasons why this paradigm is 
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widely used is because it produces reliable and high levels of false memory to the critical 
distractors.  Looking at the FTT framework, it is easy to see why this would be so.  Because 
critical distractors share the same gist traces as the studied targets, a memory decision based on 
gist would support not only the acceptance of targets, but also critical distractors.  Interestingly, 
critical distractors may be accepted with high levels of confidence, and is sometimes 
accompanied by vivid imagery of its presentation even though it was never presented (Brainerd, 
Wright, Reyna, & Mojardin, 2001).     
 In another example, FTT was the first theory to predict the overdistribution error.  As 
described before, overdistribution is a memory error where not only is the true event accepted, 
but the false event is simultaneously accepted even in cases where the true and false events are 
mutually exclusive.  Overdistribution usually requires an indirect method of measurement, as 
asking someone if an item is both a target and a critical distractor, for example, may be rejected 
simply on a metacognitive basis rather than memory (e.g. something can’t be both a target and a 
critical distractor based on definitions alone).  Designs that measure overdistribution rely on the 
conjoint recognition paradigm (Brainerd et al., 2001).  In this paradigm, participants are given a 
standard recognition task but with some new probes during test.  In a standard design, 
participants are usually asked if an item was ‘old’ or ‘new’.  In conjoint recognition, participants 
are asked three questions: “Was it a target”, “Was it new but related to a target”, and “Was it 
either a target or new but related to a target.”  These three probes can then be used to distinguish 
if a memory error was due to forgetting, false memory, or overdistribution.  Let us take the 
example where Bagpipe was a critical distractor in a DRM task.  In the case of forgetting, all 
three probes would be rejected.  In the case of false memory, the probe “it was a target” and “it 
was either a target or new but related to a target” would be accepted and “it was new but related” 
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would be rejected.  In the case of overdistribution, all three probes would be accepted.  Again, it 
is easy to see how overdistribution can be predicted in semantic false recognition paradigms with 
FTT’s definition of gist traces: because gist traces support all three probes in the conjoint 
recognition paradigm, it supports acceptances for all three descriptions, resulting in 
overdistribution.  
The purpose of this dissertation is to improve upon the existing memory models to better 
represent memory processes.  There were two sets of experiments that targeted two different 
gaps in the current memory modeling literature.  The first builds upon a series of studies that 
have looked at overdistribution errors.  Because overdistribution errors are a relatively new 
discovery, there currently does not exist a model that sufficiently accommodates the two 
methods, direct and indirect, in which it is measured.  The second set of experiments address a 
weakness in existing models, in which they are not able to measure the relative speed of memory 
processes.  Because the first and second set of experiments focus on different models and 
different experimental designs, I will first discuss the modeling background of overdistribution 
errors followed by details of Experiment 1, and then I will discuss the modeling background 
involved in measuring process speeds followed by details of Experiment 2 and Experiment 3. 
Overdistribution Errors 
Because overdistribution errors are defined by their contradictory nature of an item as 
having been remembered in both correct and incorrect contexts, it is often impractical to measure 
its occurrence directly (e.g. asking a subject if a test item is both a target and a related distractor).  
In the earliest research on overdistribution errors, the phenomenon was measured in semantic 
false memory designs using indirect measures.  With the conjoint recognition design, these 
studies had available three independent estimates of responses for each test cue, which could be 
 5 
 
used to calculate overdistribution: (a) P(T), the probability that an item is judged to be a target; 
(b) P(R), the probability that an item is judged to be a related distractor; and (c) P(TUR), the 
probability that an item is judged to be either a target or a related distractor. 
 Taking advantage of Kolmogorov’s axiom, a simple rule of probability, it is possible to 
estimate the overdistribution index P(T∩R), or the probability that an item is judged to be both a 
target and a related distractor.  For any two events T and R, the sum of their probabilities equal 
the sum of their disjunction and their conjunction:  
P(T) + P(R) = P(TUR) + P(T∩R)  (1) 
Written another way, it is:  
P(T) + P(R) – P(TUR) = P(T∩R)  (2) 
Logically, the probability of the conjunction must equal zero, because it is impossible for 
something to be both a target and a related distractor.  A positive value of P(T∩R), then, is the 
measure of overdistribution.  
 Brainerd & Reyna (2008) first used FTT to predict overdistribution, and Brainerd et al. 
(2010) first formalized it in a mathematical model and demonstrated how manipulations that 
increased gist retrieval increased the memory distortion.  Brainerd & Reyna (2008) calculated 
overdistribution by compiling data of the three conjoint recognition response probabilities in a 
between subjects design.  Though they observed evidence of overdistribution as FTT predicted, 
the weakness was that, because it was a between-subjects design where no one subject received 
all three conjoint recognition probes, it was impossible to test for it in individual subjects.  
Brainerd et al. (2010) addressed this in a design where participants received all three conjoint 
recognition probes in a single experiment, and they were able to show how manipulations that 
increased reliance on gist traces (such as time delay between study and test) increased 
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overdistribution, again as predicted by FTT.   
 In 2012, Brainerd et al. showed how overdistribution errors are not only observed in 
simple recognition experiments but are also prevalent in source-monitoring designs.  In the 
source-monitoring designs, subjects are presented with two (or more) lists of words with 
different font and background color, and are asked to make source judgments rather than 
recognition judgments.  In a two-list design, then, the conjoint recognition questions are: (a.) “it 
was presented on List 1”; (b) “it was presented on List 2”; (c) “it was presented in List 1 or List 
2.”  In these experiments, none of the words were ever presented on both lists, so similar to the 
semantic design, the probability of an item as having appeared on both lists, P(L1∩L2) was zero.  
Not only did these experiments show that overdistribution is ubiquitous in item recognition but 
also source monitoring, they provided a way to directly measure the overdistribution index P(L1-
∩L2).  By definition, it is not impossible for something to have been presented on both lists, 
unlike defining something as being both a target and a related distractor.  However, 
experimentally, it can be constrained so that the conjunctive probe is impossible.  Therefore, we 
can have a situation in which participants are asked about the conjunctive probe without having 
to worry about non-memorial, metacognitive judgments that would lead to an automatic rejection 
of the probe. 
 FTT predicts overdistribution in semantic false memory designs, but also in source 
designs as well.  Verbatim traces and gist traces support two kinds of recollections that are 
important when making source judgments: target and context recollection (Brainerd, Gomes, & 
Moran, 2014).  Target recollection is when traces of an item’s presentation can be retrieved, 
while context recollection is when traces of the contextual details surrounding an item’s 
presentation can be retrieved.  Until recently, it has been assumed that context recollection is 
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intrinsically linked to target recollection, in that context recollection occurs only if there is target 
recollection.  However, there is growing evidence supporting the idea that not only can one have 
target recollection without context recollection, but that they can have context recollection 
without target recollection (e.g. Ceci, Fitneva, & Williams, 2010; Brainerd et al., 2014; Brainerd, 
Gomes, & Nakamura, 2015).  Overdistribution in source memory, then, increases when there is 
target recollection without context recollection, but is suppressed when there is context 
recollection regardless of whether or not there is target recollection.  This is what was found in 
source memory designs (Brainerd et al., 2012; Nakamura & Brainerd, 2016).     
 Here, it is worth noting that these indirect and direct methods of measuring 
overdistribution are similar to phenomena found in the judgment and decision-making literature.  
The indirect overdistribution index is analogous to the disjunction fallacy.  The disjunction 
fallacy occurs when the sum of the probability of two mutually exclusive events (e.g. dying of a 
heart attack and dying of lung disease) is judged to be greater than the probability of their 
disjunction (e.g. dying of either a heart attack or lung disease), and this fallacy was first 
observed by Tversky and Koehler (1994).   
In the case of the direct measure of overdistribution, two types are discussed in the 
memory literature.  Conjunction illusions, which is when the impossible conjunction (e.g. 
judging something is both a target and a related distractor) is accepted at a probability greater 
than zero.  In some cases, these conjunction illusions can be so erroneous that they elevate to the 
level of conjunction fallacies, where the impossible conjunction is judged to be more probable 
than either of its constituents.  The conjunction fallacy is a famous example in judgment and 
decision-making in the form of Tversky and Kahneman’s (1983) Linda problem.  In the classic 
Linda problem, participants read a prompt about a left-leaning woman named Linda, and then are 
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asked to make three probability judgments: a.) the probability that Linda is a bank teller; b.) the 
probability that Linda is a feminist; c.) the probability that Linda is a bank teller and a feminist.  
Based on rules of probability, it is impossible for it to be more probable that Linda is both a bank 
teller and a feminist than she is to be just a bank teller, but this logical fallacy commonly occurs.  
A memory conjunction fallacy in a source memory design occurs when P(L1∩L2) > P(L1) or 
P(L1∩L2) > P(L2), and it has been observed in prior studies (Brainerd, Nakamura, Reyna, & 
Holliday, 2017; Nakamura & Brainerd, 2016).   
While this is not in the scope of the focus of the dissertation, the fact that memory 
analogues to decision fallacies exist suggests that the causes of these fallacies may originate from 
basic encoding and retrieval processes; that memory and judgment are linked.  This idea is not 
very surprising considering how fallacies in judgment and decision-making have been explained 
by assumptions in memory.  For example, support theory (ST), which was first used to describe 
disjunction fallacies by Tversky & Koehler (1994), assumes that the fallacies arise from 
limitations in cognitive resources.  According to ST, disjunctive probes require more mental 
resources to unpack into their individual components, and therefore require more effort to 
retrieve evidence representative of them which in turn leads to an underestimation of the 
disjunctive probe.  A link between judgment and decision-making and memory seems obvious, 
and yet very few studies have been conducted in exploring the link between fallacies in judgment 
and decision-making and fallacies in memory.  Because the designs to study overdistribution are 
memory analogues to two fallacies in judgment and decision-making, a study in overdistribution 
may provide some unique insights into process-level mechanisms of the fallacies in decision 
making as well.    
What is unique about FTT is that it predicts overdistribution, and stipulates conditions in 
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which it will increase (e.g. manipulations that increase target recollection), rather than simply 
explain why it might exist.  The source guessing model by Batchelder and Riefer (1990), is one 
model that can accommodate overdistribution, but does not predict it the way FTT is able to.  
The source guessing model is defined over a source recognition task where subjects study two 
(or more) lists of words.  During test they are first asked to make an old-new recognition 
judgment, and if an item is judged to be old, they make a source judgment about it.  In this 
model, there are three memory parameters (D1, d1, DN), one guessing parameter (g), and one bias 
parameter (b).  D1 is the probability that subject has target recollection for a List 1 target, d1 is 
the probability that, for words where participants had target recollection for a List 1 target, they 
have context recollection, and DN is the probability that subjects correctly judge distractors as 
being new.  The guessing parameter g is the probability that for List 1 items where target 
recollection could be retrieved, subjects guess its source as the one mentioned in the test probe, 
and b is the probability that for distractors, subjects guess its source as the one mentioned in the 
test probe.  For a List 1 item, subjects will accept the correct probe P(L1) when they have target 
recollection and context recollection, and also when they only have target recollection and they 
guess its context. They will accept the incorrect probe P(L2) when they only have target 
recollection and they guess its context, and they will accept the disjunctive probe P(L1UL2) when 
they have target and context recollection, or when they only have target recollection and guess its 
context.  As you can see with these definitions, whether or not there is overdistribution is 
dependent on the value of the guessing parameter, because when g=0.5 the relationship of P(L1), 
P(L2), and P(L1UL2) becomes additive.  However, because overdistribution in the source 
guessing model is entirely dependent on a non-memorial process ‘guessing,’ it is not possible to 
make predictions about conditions that will increase or decrease the phenomenon, and by 
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extension it will not be able to explain how it can be brought under experimental control. 
Disjunction and Conjunction Fallacies in Memory 
The main focus of Experiment 1 is on the source design of overdistribution, rather than 
the semantic false memory design.  Source designs provide a unique opportunity to have all four 
response probability estimates measured directly from the experimental design, so we have all 
four estimates from the equation P(T) + P(R) – P(TUR) = P(T∩R).  In other words, it is possible 
to see how well the indirect measurement of overdistribution P(L1) + P(L2) – P(L1UL2)  predicts 
the direct measure of overdistribution P(L1∩L2).   
What would this allow us to accomplish?  First, this equality assumes that the two 
designs used to study overdistribution are inherently linked, and we can test that assumption.  
Second, this equality also assumes that the two fallacies embedded in these designs, disjunction 
and conjunction fallacies, are also linked to each other.  Prior experiments that have studied 
memory disjunction and conjunction fallacies separately, however, have shed light that methods 
that measure overdistribution directly or indirectly do not tap the same memory processes.  In 
Brainerd et al. (2014), direct measures of overdistribution were compared with indirect measures 
of overdistribution in the same general design, but in two different experiments.  In the design, 
participants studied two or three lists of uncategorized words that differed in frequency and 
concreteness, and took either a disjunction fallacy source memory experiment (indirect 
overdistribution measure) or a conjunction fallacy source memory experiment (direct 
overdistribution measure).  In general, the estimates of indirect and direct overdistribution 
measures differed reliably. 
 A separate study in 2016 by Nakamura and Brainerd first showed how memory processes 
may differ for indirect and direct measures of overdistribution, or disjunction and conjunction 
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fallacies in memory.  In their design, subjects studied two lists of words, some words belonging 
in categories while other words were not.  Then, they took a source recognition test with either 
disjunctive or conjunctive probes.  Because this design used categorized words and therefore test 
probes not only included targets but also related distractors, it was possible to test whether or not 
disjunction and conjunction fallacies could occur for items that had never been presented.  
Related distractors were a test to see if target recollection was an important factor in the 
occurrence of these fallacies.  The data suggested that target recollection was important, but only 
for disjunction fallacies.  Disjunction fallacies were only observed for targets, lending evidence 
to the fact that target recollection is important for these fallacies to occur.  Similarly, they only 
appeared for List 1 targets than for List 2 targets, and it has been shown previously that target 
recollection is susceptible to proactive interference and therefore would be greater for List 1 
items (Brainerd, Gomes, & Nakamura, 2015).  Unlike disjunction fallacies, conjunction illusions 
appeared for both targets and related distractors, lending evidence to the fact that target 
recollection is not necessary for these errors to occur.  Furthermore, conjunction fallacies were 
greater for List 2, rather than List 1, suggesting that not only are they not reliant on target 
recollection, but may be reliant on context recollection.  
It is clear that there seems to be process differences for memory disjunction and 
conjunction fallacies.  However, it is not currently possible to directly compare such processes 
because there is no model that accommodates both disjunction and conjunction designs.  While a 
few models have been proposed for disjunction fallacy designs, but there is no memory model 
that fits conjunction fallacy designs to date, and one that also accommodates disjunction 
fallacies.  I will briefly discuss two models that have been used to fit memory disjunction fallacy 




CPD and DR Model 
The conjoint process dissociation (CPD) model was first developed by Brainerd et al. 
(2012) to fit disjunction fallacy data in source memory designs.  The model was a modification 
of Jacoby’s (1991) process-dissociation model, which uses the same source recognition design 
often used in source overdistribution studies, but without the disjunctive probe.  The process-
dissociation model was defined over acceptance probabilities for targets presented on List 1 as 
follows:  
P(L1?|L1) = R + (1 – R)F  (3) 
P(L2?|L1) = (1 – R)F   (4)   
In the model, R is the probability that a List 1 target’s presentation can be recollected, and F is 
the probability that a List 1 target’s presentation cannot be recollected but is accepted on the 
basis of familiarity.  
The CPD model built upon this so that there were enough degrees of freedom to separate 
overdistribution from true and false source memory with the additional conjoint recognition 
probe L1UL2?.  For List 1 targets, the model is as follows:  
P(L1?|L1) = R1 + (1 – R1)E2 + (1 – R1)(1 – E2)F1  (5) 
P(L2?|L1) = (1 – R1)E2 + (1 – R1)(1 – E2)F1   (6) 
P(L1UL2?|L1) = R1 + (1 – R1)(1 – E2)F1   (7) 
R1 is the probability that a List 1 cue prompts the retrieval of List 1 contextual details, E2 is the 
probability that a List 1 cue prompts the erroneous retrieval of List 2 contextual details, and F1 is 
the probability that a List 1 cue prompts item memory.  
 While the CPD model has fit data from source disjunction fallacy studies well, it has a 
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weakness in how it is defined.  In particular, the R parameter is not able to distinguish 
acceptances based on target recollection and context recollection.  In the CPD model, 
“recollection” might be referring to the retrieval of details surrounding the target’s presentation, 
or the retrieval of details surrounding the context of the target’s presentation.  The dual 
recollection (DR) model, on the other hand, gets around this problem by redefining the 
parameters to incorporate target recollection, context recollection, and familiarity.  Of course 
there is a concern that familiarity is simply something derived from context recollection, and that 
rather than having a bivariate recollection model in addition to familiarity, data can be accounted 
for with either just the target-context recollection distinction, or the recollection-familiarity 
distinction.  Brainerd, Gomes, & Moran (2015) introduced different experimental manipulations 
that should affect target recollection, context recollection, and familiarity differently, in order to 
see if they were distinct from each other.  They used a source memory conjoint recognition 
design, with key manipulations being List order (predicted to affect target and context 
recollection in opposite directions), word frequency (predicted to affect target recollection but 
not context recollection), and word concreteness (predicted to affect frequency, but not either 
forms of recollection).  The model fit their data in addition to providing evidence that the three 
key manipulations affected the two kinds of recollection and familiarity in different ways.  
Therefore, the DR model is much more comprehensive than the CPD model.  
For List 1 targets, the DR model is as follows:  
P(L1?|L1) = C1 + (1 – C1)T1 + (1 – C1)(1 – T1)b   (8) 
         P(L2?|L1) = (1 – C1)T1 + (1 – C1)(1 – T1)b                        (9) 
         P(L1UL2?|L1) = C1 + (1 – C1)T1 + (1 – C1)(1 – T1)F1 +  
             (1 – C1)(1 – T1)(1 – F1)b12                 (10) 
C1 is the probability that a List 1 cue prompts retrieval of contextual details surrounding its 
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presentation.  T1 is the probability that a List 1 cue prompts a conscious reinstatement of its 
presentation on the study list.  F1 is the probability that a List 1 cue invokes a high level of 
familiarity that leads to its acceptance as having been presented at study.  The two bias 
parameters b and b12 are the probability of accepting the cue based on non-memorial tendencies 
to accept a cue. 
Revised DR Model 
The DR model was chosen as a candidate to modify in a way to accommodate the 
conjunction fallacy source memory experiment, so that memory processes can be measured and 
compared between memory disjunction and conjunction fallacies.  Everything is the same as the 
standard DR model, except for the addition of the conjunction probe, and a new memory 
parameter.  For List 1 targets, the modified DR model is as follows:  
P(L1?|L1) = C1 + (1 – C1)T1 + (1 – C1)(1 – T1)b   (11) 
         P(L2?|L1) = (1 – C1)T1 + (1 – C1)(1 – T1)P1 +  
    (1 – C1)(1 – T1)(1 – P1)b                        (12) 
         P(L1UL2?|L1) = C1 + (1 – C1)T1 + (1 – C1)(1 – T1)F1 +  
             (1 – C1)(1 – T1)(1 – F1)b12                  (13) 
         P(L1∩L2?|L1) = C1P1 + C1(1 – P1)b1∩2 + (1 – C1) b1∩2          (14) 
The new parameter, P, is phantom context recollection, and is the probability that a cue invokes 
the recollection of erroneous contextual details consistent with the wrong source, and the full list 
of the revised dual recollection model parameters can be found on Table 1.1.  It is analogous to 
the phantom recollection parameter in the conjoint recognition model for standard recognition 
designs (Brainerd et al., 2001).  Phantom recollection is a phenomenon observed in semantic 
false memory paradigms, where subjects retrieve erroneous contextual details for items that were 
never studied.  This phenomenon is known to increase with manipulations that strongly increase 
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retrieval of gist traces. 
 
Table 1.1 
Parameters of the Revised Dual Recollection Model 
Parameter Definition 
C1 
Probability that a List 1 cue prompts retrieval of contextual 
details surrounding its presentation 
T1 
Probability that a List 1 cue prompts a conscious 
reinstatement of its presentation on the study list 
F1 
Probability that a List 1 cue invokes a high level of familiarity 
that leads to its acceptance as having been presented at study 
P1 
Probability that a List 1 cue invokes the recollection of 
erroneous contextual details consistent with List 2 
b 
Probability of accepting a non-disjunctive/conjunctive cue 
based on bias 
b12 
Probability of accepting a disjunctive cue based on bias 
b1∩2 
Probability of accepting a conjunctive cue based on bias 
 
 
 Phantom recollection was first proposed when it was found that while theories without it 
could explain false alarms on the basis of familiarity, it could not explain false alarms that were 
accompanied by details vivid enough as though subjects could re-experience their presentation.  
Brainerd et al. (2001) demonstrated improved model fits when phantom recollection was 
included in the conjoint recognition model, and their experiments showed that it increased with 
retrieval of strong gist traces, suggesting that strong gist encouraged retrieval of contextual cues 
surrounding a related target’s presentation.  On this basis, it is possible for something similar to 
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happen in source monitoring studies as well.  For example, imagine a study in which a subject is 
asked to study two lists of words with shared categories across both lists.  A word (e.g. oak) 
presented on List 1 was never presented on List 2, but the gist of it belonging in a category (e.g. 
trees) was shared between both lists.  Similar to phantom recollection, if strong gist can 
encourage retrieval of contextual cues surrounding a related target’s (e.g. maple) presentation, 
then it seems plausible that in some cases it may lead to the retrieval of erroneous contextual 
cues from the wrong source (e.g. retrieving List 2 contextual cues for a List 1 word “oak” 
because related word “maple” was on List 2).   
 This is the basis for phantom context recollection in the modified dual recollection 
model.  This is also similar to the E parameter in the CPD model, and thus this revised model can 
be thought of as a combination of both the original DR model and the CPD model.  The addition 
of this new parameter changes two parts to the original model: accepting the wrong probe for a 
cue (e.g. accepting L2? for a List 1 target), and accepting the new, conjunctive probe added to it 
(L1∩L2?).  There is no change for P(L1?|L1), because phantom recollection (and phantom context 
recollection) occurs when contextual cues are pulled from the probe, so that contextual cues from 
the wrong source will not be pulled unless it is mentioned in the probe (e.g. L2?|L1).  In addition, 
the parameter is not included in the disjunctive probe, because the disjunctive probe is accepted 
if traces consistent with either List 1 or List 2 are retrieved, and the effect of accepting on the 
basis of phantom context recollection should be negligible compared to accepting on the basis of 
the other memory processes.  However, it is an important piece for accepting conjunctive probes.  
Conjunctive probes require subjects to remember traces that are consistent with not only the 
correct source, but also consistent with the incorrect source.  Therefore, conjunctive probes are 
accepted when there is both context recollection and phantom context recollection, but is 
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Figure 1.1. Revised dual recollection model tree for targets and distractors. 
dependent on bias when there is only one or the other.  The tree for the revised dual recollection 













































EXPERIMENT 1: MODELING CONJUNCTION AND DISJUNCTION FALLACIES IN 
MEMORY 
 
There are two main goals of Experiment 1, and the design reflects these goals.  The first 
goal is to use modeling techniques to identify the memory processes that are the root cause of the 
discrepancies observed in measures of overdistribution when using indirect versus direct 
methods.  In other words, what processes are different when looking at memory disjunction 
fallacies and conjunction illusions respectively?  To answer this question, the design should have 
manipulations that affect disjunction and conjunction errors differently.  In the prior research, 
there was evidence for target recollection being important for disjunction fallacies, and context 
recollection being important for conjunction illusions, so manipulations that would affect target 
and context recollection variably would be ideal.  List order is one such manipulation that has 
been used in previous studies (Brainerd, Holliday, Nakamura, & Reyna, 2014; Nakamura & 
Brainerd, 2016).  I hypothesize that target recollection will be greater for targets presented in 
earlier lists, and context recollection will be greater for targets presented in later lists, and that 
disjunction fallacies will be greater for targets from earlier lists and conjunction fallacies will be 
greater for targets from later lists.  A two-list source monitoring design would be sufficient to 
test list-order effects for disjunction and conjunction fallacies (Brainerd et al., 2014).  This will 
be the first time that the two recollections will be measured in this paradigm using a model to 
pinpoint the process differences between the two fallacies. 
The second manipulation is categorization.  According to the modified dual recollection 
model, both fallacies depend on phantom context recollection.  In prior research, the disjunction 
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fallacy was caused by an increase in accepting the wrong probe (e.g. accepting L2? for List 1 
targets) rather than a decrease in accepting the disjunctive probe (Nakamura & Brainerd, 2016), 
which includes the phantom context recollection parameter.  The conjunction illusion is entirely 
dependent on phantom context recollection according to the model equation.  Therefore, a 
manipulation that affects this parameter should see an increase in both fallacies.  Because 
phantom recollection increases with high gist in conjoint recognition, it is reasonable to predict 
that phantom context recollection would also increase with greater gist, and will be reflected in 
model parameter estimates (Brainerd et al., 2001).  I implemented the categorization 
manipulation from Nakamura & Brainerd’s (2016) study, where some words were categorized 
on both lists (high gist), while other words were uncategorized (low gist).  This also allows for 
the possibility to look for disjunction and conjunction fallacies for related distractors: if the 
fallacies occur for distractors, then target recollection is not a necessity for the fallacies to occur.  
Based on prior data, I expect the conjunction illusions to be present for related distractors, but 
not disjunction fallacies.  
The second goal of Experiment 1 is to test model fit for the new, proposed modified DR 
model that fits not only disjunction fallacy data, but also conjunction fallacy data.  To date, no 
model exists that accounts for both types of experiments, making it impossible to compare 
parameter estimates of memory processes from them.  In addition, because process comparisons 
are of key interest, it would be ideal for both disjunction and conjunction fallacies to be tested in 
the same experiment.  This is simple to accommodate: rather than have just three types of probes 
during test (e.g. L1?, L2?, L1UL2?), there will be all four types of probes during test (e.g. L1?, 
L2?, L1UL2?, L1∩L2?).  The proposed model should fit fine regardless of whether disjunctive and 





66 introductory psychology students (48 female, 18 male) were recruited from the same 
pool used by Brainerd, Holliday et al. 2014.  The students participated to fulfill a course 
requirement.    
Materials 
The source memory design used in prior research to study memory disjunction and 
conjunction fallacies was modified for the present experiment.  12 categories were pulled from 
the Uyeda and Mandler (1980) prototypicality norms.  All of the words from this pool are 
concrete nouns.  Of the 12 categories, 8 categories were randomly selected to appear on the study 
lists, while the remaining 4 categories appeared as unrelated categorized distractors at test.  For 
each of the 8 categories presented at study, 12 words with the highest typicality were chosen to 
be used for the experiment, and of these, 4 words were presented on List 1, 4 words were 
presented on List 2, and 4 words were used as related distractors at test.  For each of the 4 
categories used as unrelated categorized distractors for bias correction data, 8 words with the 
highest typicality were chosen for the experiment.  Finally, 32 concrete nouns that did not appear 
on any of the lists from the prototypicality norms were chosen from 
the Toglia & Battig (1978) database, and they were chosen on the basis of equivalent word 
frequency values as the categorized words.  
Two study lists were constructed for the experiment.  Both lists comprised of 72 concrete 
nouns.  Each list had 8 categories of 4 words each that were shared across both lists; however, 
none of the words appeared on both List 1 and List 2. (e.g. the category “bird” appeared on both 
lists, but List 1 had “eagle,” “hummingbird,” “chicken,” and “starling,” while List 2 had “robin,” 
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“bluejay,” “swallow,” “oriole”).  Words that were categorized always appeared in blocks of four 
to make the categories salient to participants.  In addition to categorized words, each list 
contained 32 uncategorized words.  To prevent participants from adopting a metacognitive 
strategy to reject all conjunctive probes because they could not remember any target having been 
presented on both lists, I interspersed the study lists with 4 words that appeared on both lists but 
were never tested.  Last, two opening and two closing buffers unrelated to any of the presented 
words were included on both lists.    
As in prior studies of memory disjunction and conjunction fallacies, each study list was 
accompanied by distinctive visual cues such as font (e.g. Arial on List 1, Stencil on List 2) and 
background color (e.g. Yellow on List 1, White on List 2).  Therefore, each list could be 
identified by a certain combination of font and background color, bolstering the contextual cues 
associated to the lists.    
The test contained 224 words.  Of these, 32 words were targets that had been studied: 8 
categorized targets from List 1, 8 categorized targets from List 2, 8 uncategorized targets from 
List 1, and 8 uncategorized targets from List 2.  There were also 32 related distractors from 
categories that appeared at study but were never presented themselves, 32 unrelated categorized 
distractors that were from the 4 categories that never appeared at study, and 32 unrelated 
uncategorized distractors.  Each of these cues were factorially paired with one of four possible 
episodic descriptions: “It was on List 1,” “It was on List 2,” “It was on List 1 or List 2,” “It was 
on List 1 and List 2.”  Participants were asked to accept or reject each probe depending 
on whether they judged the episodic description to be true or false.  Two randomized versions of 





At the start of the experiment, participants were informed that they would be taking part 
in a memory test and should try to remember the words presented to the best of their ability.  The 
words were presented at a 3-s rate, centered on the screen and printed in 72-point font.  After the 
first list was completed, there was a 15-s pause before the second list.  Once the participants had 
finished studying the second list, they were provided instructions for the upcoming memory 
test.  Participants were told that during the test, they would see words that they had seen before 
as well as words that were new, and that they would have to make judgments on whether the 
episodic descriptions paired with the word were accurate.  They were specifically instructed to 
only accept the test probes if they believed them to be true, and to reject them 
otherwise.  Examples problems were provided to the participants so that they would understand 
and be familiar with the task.  The 224 test words were presented in a random order one at a 
time, and the participants completed the test in a self-paced manner.    
Results 
Disjunction Fallacies 
The following analysis was conducted on bias corrected (two-high-threshold method; 
2HT) acceptance probabilities for both targets and related distractors.  Bias corrected values and 
their calculations are reported on Table 2.1, and raw values of unrelated distractors used to 
calculate bias correction are reported on Table 2.2.  The 2HT correction is a method that has 
been used in prior research on memory disjunction and conjunction fallacies, and alternative 
methods of bias correction did not yield significant differences in the results (Brainerd et al., 






Bias Corrected Acceptance Probabilities  
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
        List-context/statistic 
 Word content _________________________________________________________________ 
      p(L1)  p(L2)  p(L1UL2) p(L1∩L2) 
 _____________________________________________________________________________ 
                    Targets 
List 1 
  Categorized    .41(.27) .23(.27) .46(.29) .12(.17)  
 
   Uncategorized   .35(.22) .37(.28) .48(.27) .08(.16) 
  
List 2 
   Categorized    .15(.24) .43(.30) .37(.27) .15(.20) 
 
   Uncategorized   .12(.23) .43(.27) .40(.29) .06(.16) 
  
                
                
 
                
 
   Related Distractors   .00(.21) .03(.22) .01(.20) .01(.12)
 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note.  Bias was corrected for Categorized (List-specific and Shared) items by subtracting the raw 
acceptance values of Categorized targets and related distractors by Unrelated Categorized 
distractors.  Bias was corrected for Uncategorized items by subtracting the raw acceptance 
values of Uncategorized targets by Unrelated Uncategorized distractors.  Standard deviations 




















Unrelated Distractor Acceptance Probabilities  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
        List-context/statistic 
 Word content __________________________________________________________________ 
      p(L1)  p(L2)  p(L1UL2) p(L1∩L2) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 





 Uncategorized    .26(.21) .17(.16) .27(.23) .09(.15) 
  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Standard deviations are provided in the parentheses 
 
 
The disjunction fallacy occurs when the sum of the probability of accepting “It was on 
List 1”, p(L1), and the probability of accepting “It was on List 2”, p(L2), is greater than the 
probability of accepting “It was on List 1 or List 2”, p(L1UL2).  One sample t-tests with a test 
value of 0 were conducted on the disjunction fallacy index, p(L1) + p(L2) – p(L1UL2).  For 
targets, disjunction fallacies were observed for all List 1 conditions and they were also observed 
for all List 2 conditions except for Uncategorized High Frequency targets (Figure 2.1, Table 
2.3).  As in prior research, disjunction fallacies were not observed for related distractors (p > 
0.6).    
A 2 (list: 1 vs. 2) × 2 (category: categorized vs. uncategorized) × 2 (frequency: high vs. 
low) ANOVA was conducted on the disjunction fallacy index for targets.  There was a main 
effect of List, F(1,65) = 15.19, p<0.001, partial η2 = 0.20, with higher levels of disjunction 





























Disjunction fallacy index p(L1)+p(L2) – p(L1-L2) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
                mean                p value 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 List 1 
  Categorized HF    0.22     0.003  
  Categorized LF    0.15     0.022 
  Uncategorized HF    0.15     0.047  
  Uncategorized LF    0.33     <0.001 
 
List 2 
  Categorized HF    0.22     0.003 
  Categorized LF    0.20     0.002 
  Uncategorized HF    0.09     0.16 
  Uncategorized LF    0.20     0.002 
 
Related Distractors HF   0.00     1.00  











There are two ways a disjunction fallacy may occur: if the acceptance probabilities of the 
nondisjunctive probes are high, or if the acceptance probability of the disjunctive probe is low.  
A 2 (category) × 2 (list) × 2 (frequency) × 4 (probe: accept correct vs. accept incorrect vs. accept 
disjunction vs. accept conjunction) was conducted on bias corrected acceptance probabilities for 
targets.  Because list effects were observed for disjunction fallacies, there was a particular 
interest in seeing if there was a two-way List × Probe interaction effect.  There was, F(3, 195) = 
14.58, partial η2 = 0.18.  According to post-hoc comparisons, the incorrect question was accepted 
more often for List 1 targets (L2?|L1) than for List 2 targets (L1?|L2) (mean difference = 0.17, SE 
= 0.03, p<0.001). The disjunctive question was also accepted more for List 1 targets than for List 
2 targets (mean difference = 0.09, SE = 0.02, p<0.001).  The observation that disjunction 
fallacies were greater for List 1 than for List 2 is, based on these results, most likely due to the 
greater acceptance of the incorrect probe for List 1 targets.  This result was also found in prior 
research (Nakamura & Brainerd, 2016). 
Conjunction Illusions 
The following analysis was conducted on bias corrected (2HT) acceptance probabilities 
for both targets and related distractors.  Bias corrected values and their calculations are reported 
on Table 2.1, and raw values of unrelated distractors used to calculate bias correction are 
reported on Table 2.2.  Conjunction illusions occur when the probability of accepting the 
conjunctive probe, p(L1∩L2), is greater than zero.  Conjunction fallacies are stronger iterations of 
the conjunction illusion where not only is p(L1∩L2) greater than zero, which is illogical, but it is 
greater than one or the other of the nonconjunctive probes.   
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To determine if there were any conjunction illusions, a one sample t-test was conducted 
on p(L1∩L2).  Conjunction illusions were observed on all conditions for both List 1 and List 2 for 
targets, and they were also observed for high frequency related distractors (Figure 2.2, Table 
2.4).  A 2 (list: 1 vs. 2) × 2 (category: categorized vs. uncategorized) × 2 (frequency: high vs. 
low) ANOVA was conducted on the conjunction illusion index for targets.  There was a main 
effect of Category, F(1,65) = 8.06, p=0.006, partial η2 = 0.11, where conjunction illusions were 




































Conjunction illusion index p(L1∩L2) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
                mean                p value 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 List 1 
  Categorized HF    0.12     <0.001  
  Categorized LF    0.12     <0.001 
  Uncategorized HF    0.09     0.002  
  Uncategorized LF    0.08     0.004 
 
List 2 
  Categorized HF    0.18     <0.001 
  Categorized LF    0.11     0.001 
  Uncategorized HF    0.07     0.03 
  Uncategorized LF    0.06     0.02  
 
Related Distractors HF   0.05     0.02  
Related Distractors LF   -0.03     0.07 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
To determine if any of the conjunction illusions became conjunction fallacies, a paired t-
test was conducted on the probability of accepting the conjunctive probe, p(L1∩L2), and the 
probability of accepting either of the nonconjunctive probes, p(L1) and p(L2).  Conjunction 
fallacies were not observed in this experiment. 
Model Results 
Of key interest to this study was whether a revised dual recollection model could produce 
acceptable fits of the data from both disjunction and conjunction designs.  Because there is 
evidence that different memory processes operate on disjunction and conjunction fallacies, I was 
interested in whether model results would support this prior finding (Nakamura & Brainerd, 
2016).  
The modified dual recollection model contains seven parameters (C, P, F, T, b, b1U2, 
and b1∩2), and the present design provides eight free probabilities with which to estimate 
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them.  Therefore, the fit test for this model to determine if it is acceptable to account for the 
response probabilities is a G2(1) statistic, with a critical value 3.84 to reject the null hypothesis of 
fit at the 0.05 level.  The null hypothesis could not be rejected for all conditions except for high 
frequency uncategorized items for both List 1 and List 2 (Table 2.5).      
Table 2.5 
Model fit results for Revised Dual Recollection Model 
 G2 C T F P b b12 b1∩2 
L1 Categorized HF 3.07 0.24 0.41 0.13 0.54 0.27 0.41 0.05 
L1 Categorized LT 0.47 0.19 0.43 0.47 0.70 0.18 0.25 0.08 
L1 Uncategorized HF 11.25 0.09 0.37 0.26 1.00 0.28 0.34 0.13 
L1 Uncategorized LF 0.47 0.19 0.43 0.47 0.70 0.18 0.25 0.08 
 
L2 Categorized HF 2.05 0.20 0.38 0.00 0.94 0.27 0.42 0.05 
L2 Categorized LT 0.50 0.32 0.38 0.00 0.40 0.18 0.24 0.08 
L2 Uncategorized HF 10.93 0.14 0.27 0.13 0.56 0.28 0.34 0.12 
L2 Uncategorized LF 3.30 0.30 0.41 0.06 0.20 0.15 0.20 0.05 
 
The results of the model fits were surprising, considering how the dual recollection model 
has fit very well for uncategorized items in prior studies (e.g. Brainerd et al., 2012).  In order to 
see if the poor fits were due to the modifications to the original dual recollection model, fit tests 
were run using the prior DR model using only the data from the disjunction fallacy part of the 
design.  With five parameters with six free empirical probabilities to estimate them, the fit test is 
a G2(1) statistic with a critical value of 3.84 to reject the null hypothesis of fit at the 0.05 
level.  Again, only high frequency uncategorized items for both List 1 and List 2 failed the test.   
One possibility for poor model fits, especially with regards to the two high frequency 
uncategorized conditions, is that assumptions made about the data were not necessarily true.  
Namely, the model assumes that there is an absence of individual differences in parameter 
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values, but this may not have been the case (Brainerd et al., 2015).  For this study I have 
followed the conventional approach to modeling; that is, to first identify if a model fits 
aggregated data and then to move on to models that allow for individual differences. The 
relevant test for the present study is a X2 statistic of the following form (Smith & Batchelder, 
2008):  
X2(N – 1) = ∑ {(𝑅
𝑁
𝑖=1 i
 – Re)2 / Re} + (M – Ri – Re*)2 / Re*}   (15) 
 
In this test, N is the number of subjects, Ri is the total number of acceptances of a 
particular cue-probe combination (e.g., L1?|HFL1targets), Re is (∑ 𝑅𝑁𝑖=1 i )/ N, Re* = M –  Re, and 
M is the total number of the particular cue-probe combination that subjects responded to.  
There were four unique target cue-probe combinations and four distractor cue-probe 
combinations for the two experimental conditions (e.g. List 1 uncategorized high frequency 
words) whose data did not provide good fits to the model; therefore, sixteen tests for individual 
differences were conducted.  Because N = 66, the critical value of X2 to reject the null hypothesis 
of no individual differences at the 0.05 level was 84.82.   
Out of the sixteen tests, for both L1 and L2 high frequency uncategorized items, the null 
hypothesis was rejected at a high level of confidence for disjunctive (L1UL2?) and conjunctive 
(L1∩L2?) probes for distractors in both L1 (disjunctive: 96.88, conjunctive: 104.41) and L2 
(disjunctive: 96.88, conjunctive: 104.41) experimental conditions.  Considering how the model’s 
predicted values for the bias parameters varied greatly with observed values though not as much 
for other parameters, it appears that model fit failed because of individual differences in response 
bias.  The presence of individual differences in the data suggests that while the aggregated data 
did not produce acceptable fits, individual data may fit.  The next step therefore was to fit the 
model to individual data for both L1 and L2 high frequency uncategorized conditions.  If the 
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model is correct, the values for the G2(1) statistic for individualized fits will be within acceptable 
boundaries when the fit values are averaged across the subject sample. The mean G2 statistics for 
the two conditions were 3.26 and 3.11 for L1 and L2 respectively, indicating that when individual 
differences were accounted for, the model provided acceptable fits.  In addition, 67% of the 
participants had G2(1) < 3.84 for the L1 high frequency uncategorized condition, and 70% of the 
participants had G2(1) < 3.84 for the L2 high frequency uncategorized condition.  Therefore, we 
can attribute fit failures for the aggregated data in these two conditions to the violation of the 
assumption of no individual differences.  In sum, the revised dual recollection model provides 
acceptable fits for all 8 experimental conditions. 
Parameter Comparisons 
Estimates for the parameter values for the revised dual recollection model are reported on 
Table 3.5.  The main purpose for the following analysis is to determine if there are any 
differences in memory processes depending on condition differences such as the list the target 
was presented on, or its relative frequency.  We can determine this using a series of likelihood 
ratio tests.  First we run an omnibus test with a null hypothesis CatL1HF = CatL1LF = CatL2HF 
= CatL2LF = UncatL1HF = UncatL1LF = UncatL2HF = UncatL2LF, with a G
2(7) statistic with a 
critical value of 14.07, for each of the four memory parameters (C, P, F, T), and three bias 
parameters (b, b1U2, b1∩2).  If the null hypothesis is rejected, then we run likelihood ratio tests 
separated by category (L1HF = L1LF = L2HF = L2LF for categorized items, and L1HF = L1LF = 
L2HF = L2LF for uncategorized items) and list (CatHF = CatLF = UncatHF = UncatLF for List 
1 items, CatHF = CatLF = UncatHF = UncatLF for List 2 items) with a G2(3) statistic with a 
critical value of 7.82.  Following the rejection of the null hypothesis for those sets of analyses, 
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we move on to pairwise tests with a G2(1) statistic with a critical value of 3.84 to identify any 
parameter differences based on Categorization, List, and Frequency.  
 The first omnibus test produced null hypothesis rejection for six of the seven parameters: 
context recollection (16.28), phantom context recollection (16.90), familiarity (23.79), b (71.51), 
b1U2 (60.96), and b1∩2
 (19.60).  For the next set of omnibus tests separated within categories, 
familiarity (13.23), b (29.84), and b1U2 (35.16) produced null hypothesis rejections for 
categorized items, and familiarity (9.56), b (41.53), b1U2 (20.89), b1∩2 (11.41) produced null 
hypothesis rejections for uncategorized items.  For tests separated within lists, b (30.42), b1U2 
(23.47), and b1∩2 (8.36) produced null hypothesis rejections for List 1 items, and phantom 
context recollection (14.29), b (40.90), b1U2 (37.10), and b1∩2 (11.00) produced null hypothesis 
rejections for List 2 items.  A total of 56 pairwise tests were conducted based on the results of the 
omnibus tests (12 categorized, 16 uncategorized, 12 list 1, 16 list 2).  I will discuss the key 
findings from the tests for each parameter in the following section, first going over the memory 
parameters and then the bias parameters.  
 For phantom context recollection, P, there was a frequency effect where List 2 
categorized items had greater P for high frequency items than for low frequency items (LF=HF, 
G2(1)=5.40).  For familiarity, frequency effects were observed for categorized items on List 1 
only, where familiarity was greater for low frequency items than high frequency items (LF=HF, 
G2(1)=5.87). List effects were also observed with familiarity. Familiarity was greater for L1 than 
for L2 for low frequency items for both categorized (L1=L2, G
2(1)=10.85) and uncategorized 
(L1=L2, G
2(1)=8.12) items.  No pairwise comparisons were done for target recollection or context 
recollection as there were no null hypothesis rejections for the omnibus tests on T or C.  
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 The model contains three bias parameters, and all three had similar patterns with regards 
to experimental manipulations.  Bias b was greater for high frequency items than low frequency 
items for both categorized List 1 (LF=HF, G2(1)=14.67) and List 2 (LF=HF, G2(1)=15.16), and 
uncategorized  List 1 (LF=HF, G2(1)=15.74) and List 2 (LF=HF, G2(1)=25.33).  The same 
frequency pattern was observed for b1U2, with high frequency having greater b1U2 than low 
frequency items for categorized List 1 (LF=HF, G2(1)=16.02) and List 2 (LF=HF, G2(1)=19.13), 
and uncategorized List 1 (LF=HF, G2(1)=6.17) and List 2 (LF=HF, G2(1)=13.97). Last with 
b1∩2, it was greater for high frequency items than low frequency items for uncategorized List 2 
words (LF=HF, G2(1)=7.91).  Bias for conjunctive probes also had a category effect that was not 
observed for the other two kinds of bias, where it was greater for high frequency uncategorized 
items than for categorized items on List 1 (Cat=Uncat, G2(1)=7.91) and List 2 (Cat=Uncat, 
G2(1)=7.91  
Based on the initial hypotheses that target recollection has list effects, context 
recollection has list and categorization effects, phantom recollection has categorization effects, 
and familiarity has frequency effects, it is worth checking if the values of these parameters are in 
the predicted direction, even if significant differences were not observed at the pairwise level of 
the omnibus tests.  According to the omnibus tests, target recollection was not significantly 
different across all of the experimental manipulations.  However, the direction is still consistent 
with the prediction that it is greater on List 1 than on List 2 (L1=0.29; L2=0.24).  Regarding C, 
there were no significant differences observed at the pairwise level, but there was a main effect.  
Again, the direction of differences was in the predicted level, with C being greater on List 2 than 
on List 1 (L1=0.32; L2=0.36), and greater for categorized than uncategorized items (Cat=0.37; 
Uncat=0.31).  P was predicted to be greater on categorized items than uncategorized items, and 
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this was supported in the omnibus tests (Cat=0.39; Uncat=0.32).  Last, F was predicted to be 
greater for low frequency items than for high frequency items, and this was also supported in the 
omnibus tests (HF=0.14; LF=0.25).  Unexpectedly, F was greater for List 1 words than for List 2 
words as well (L1=0.34; L2=0.05). 
Discussion 
There were two goals in Experiment 1.  The first was to see whether indirect and direct 
measures of overdistribution were equitable, or if their indexes, disjunction fallacies and 
conjunction illusions respectively, tapped different memory processes.  The second was to 
propose a revised dual recollection model to accommodate memory conjunction illusion designs, 
so that memory processes affecting disjunction and conjunction fallacies could be directly 
compared.  Without the model, it was not possible to run direct process comparisons, and prior 
experiments relied on inferences.  
 With regards to the first goal, results replicated findings by Nakamura & Brainerd (2016) 
where the disjunction and conjunction fallacies were affected differently by certain 
manipulations.  Results fit the prediction that target recollection was necessary for disjunction 
fallacies, whereas it was not for conjunction illusions: while disjunction fallacies were only 
present for targets, conjunction illusions were observed for both targets and related distractors.  
In addition, while list order effects were present for disjunction fallacies with the fallacy being 
greater for List 1 than List 2 as predicted, there were no such list order effects for conjunction 
illusions.  Instead, categorization was the determining factor for conjunction illusions, such that 
categorized items had greater illusions than uncategorized items.  This fits with the prediction 
that greater gist would increase overdistribution errors, and therefore the conjunction illusion.  In 
addition, there has been prior work showing greater gist supports retrieval of contextual details 
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for both targets and related distractors (Ball et al., 2014; Chen, Brainerd, & Gomes, in press), and 
this is consistent with prior studies suggesting that the illusion is driven by context recollection.  
 What do these differences mean in terms of measuring overdistribution?  Recall that 
overdistribution is when memory traces consistent with multiple memory states can be retrieved, 
or ‘overdistributed,’ such that a subject will accept both true and false memories of an event.  
This definition is embedded in the revised dual recollection model for probability of accepting 
the conjunctive probe, or rather, the direct measure of overdistribution p(L1∩L2).  In the revised 
model, p(L1∩L2) will be accepted when a subject retrieves not only the contextual cues 
consistent with the true event, C, but also when they retrieve contextual cues consistent with the 
false event, P.  On the other hand, while the definition of overdistribution (that traces consistent 
with both the true and false event can be retrieved) is also embedded in the equation for the 
disjunction fallacy as well, its interpretation is different.  The conjunction illusion occurs when 
contextual cues consistent with both true and false events are retrieved, but the disjunction 
fallacy occurs when target recollection is available without context recollection.  Therefore, the 
direct measure of overdistribution, the conjunction illusion, is perhaps something that is more 
consistent with the original proposed definition of overdistribution for source memory designs. 
 The second goal of the experiment was to compare process differences across conditions 
to identify what memory processes contribute to disjunction and conjunction fallacies.  The 
revised dual recollection model with the new phantom context recollection parameter provided 
acceptable fits to the data.  According to the model, it was predicted that phantom context 
recollection was crucial for conjunction illusions (though not necessary for disjunction fallacies), 
and therefore we should observe parallel increases in P where conjunction illusions were 
elevated.  There was one manipulation that affected conjunction illusions: categorized items had 
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increased conjunction illusions than uncategorized items.  If it were true that P was important for 
the illusions, then they should also increase when words were categorized. They did.  P was 
greater when words were categorized rather than uncategorized, supporting the hypothesis that it 
is an important component for conjunction illusions.   
 One surprising finding in this experiment is the fact that there was no main effect of List 
for target recollection, unlike what has been observed in prior studies involving uncategorized 
lists using the same kind of source monitoring design (e.g. Brainerd, Gomes, & Nakamura, 2015; 
Nakamura & Brainerd 2016).  However, the direction of the effect was still supported in this 
study, with the raw value of T being larger for List 1 than for List 2.      
It is also possible that the previous assumption that target recollection was the main 
driving force of disjunction fallacies was not the full story.  Few studies have used models to 
measure process estimates in disjunction fallacy source memory designs.  Nakamura & Brainerd 
(2016) concluded that target recollection may be the driving force of disjunction fallacies based 
on List order effects, and the observation that the fallacies only occurred for targets.  However, 
they did not use model analyses, and their data can also be supported by a familiarity argument 
which is also consistent with what was found in the study by Brainerd et al. (2012).  Recall that 
the 2012 study used the CPD model, which does not distinguish between the two recollections, 
but does separate familiarity.  The 2012 study found that the disjunction fallacy increased when 
F increased, which is consistent with the results of the present experiment.  This is not to say that 
target recollection is not important at all: it was still the case that disjunction fallacies only 
appeared for targets, and not related distractors.  The interpretation may be that target 
recollection is necessary for the fallacy, but the fallacy increases with familiarity as well and the 
list effects for the present experiment reflect a familiarity effect rather than a target recollection 
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one.  Indeed, Brainerd et al. (2015) analyzed DR model parameter estimates using a categorized 
source memory design, and found list effects for target recollection that wasn’t observed in the 
present experiment.    
Last, list effects were predicted for conjunction illusions in line with the findings from 
Nakamura & Brainerd (2016), but no such effects were observed in the present experiment.  
However, this does not mean that the hypothesis that context recollection supports conjunction 
illusions is incorrect.  First, while there were no statistically significant differences in context 
recollection across lists, the direction was still consistent with predictions (L1=0.32, L2=0.36).  
Had the list differences in context recollection been significant, as was found in Brainerd et al.’s 
(2015) study, there may have been statistically significant list effects for the conjunction illusion.  
Second, previous experiments did not include the phantom context recollection parameter, which 
not only was the parameter that was defined as a necessary process for conjunction illusions to 
occur in the model, but was also predicted to be sensitive to gist manipulations.  The sensitivity 
of conjunction illusions to gist manipulations is consistent with findings from prior studies, and 
fits the predictions made by the revised DR model.     
To summarize, the revised DR model provided new evidence on the nature of disjunction 
and conjunction fallacies in memory.  While both types of memory fallacies were originally 
proposed to measure overdistribution errors indirectly and directly, there is growing support that 
indirect measures of overdistribution may be measuring something else.  While the ‘direct’ 
measure, conjunction illusions, are affected primarily by phantom context recollection, the 





INTRODUCTION: LATENCY EXTENSION MODELING 
As Experiment 1 demonstrated, models allow us to test hypotheses about phenomena 
directly, rather than relying on inferences.  In the case of the first experiment, the revised dual 
recollection model provided insight into how target recollection and familiarity drove disjunction 
fallacies and phantom context recollection drove conjunction illusions, and why calling the two 
fallacies ‘indirect’ and ‘direct’ measures of overdistribution may not be entirely accurate.  For 
the remaining experiments of this thesis, I will discuss how a new model is able to provide 
estimates of something that could not previously be measured: relative process speeds.  
 A new methodology proposed by Brainerd, Nakamura, and Lee (in press) opened the 
possibility to allow models to directly measure the relative speed of (for example) memory 
processes.  For Experiment 2, I implemented this latency extension procedure to an existing 
memory model to show how it can be applied to real data, as well as answer questions about 
process speeds that could not be answered previously.  While Experiment 2 used preexisting data 
to evaluate the fit of latency extension models and gather preliminary data on process speeds, 
Experiment 3 was designed specifically to test follow-up questions that emerged from 
Experiment 2.  I will first discuss the general hypotheses of memory process speeds in the 
literature, talk about the model that was used in Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 to answer some 
of these questions, and then discuss how this new latency extension model compares to other 
contemporary models that incorporate time course of memory processes.  
 With a greater understanding of the workings of memory, one question that remains 
unclear is whether different memory processes become available at different speeds.  In the early 
1970s, it was proposed that in recognition, vague feelings of having seen an item before, or 
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familiarity, was faster than retrieving vivid details of presented targets, or recollection (Atkinson 
& Juola, 1973, 1974).  It was thus suggested that fast recognition decisions were mostly due to 
fast familiarity, and slower decisions were due to recollection.  Mandler (1980) formalized this 
with a theoretical explanation on why familiarity and recollection operated at different speeds:  
recollection was only activated if familiarity failed to provide enough evidence to make a 
recognition decision.  Matching with theories that propose recollection to be a more effortful 
process than familiarity, it seems plausible that the more cognitively demanding process would 
be slower than the less demanding one (Gardiner, 1988; Jacoby, Toth, Yonelinas, & Debner, 
1997).  
 However, studies that tested the hypothesis of familiarity being faster than recollection 
did not provide conclusive evidence for it. Gillund and Shiffrin (1984) tested whether familiarity 
is faster than recollection by using a speeded response recognition design.  In their experiment, 
they had subjects make standard old/new recognition judgments to different types of cues 
(targets and distractors) in fast and slow timed conditions.  In fast conditions, subjects were 
required to make a decision within 900ms of a cue’s presentation, while in slow conditions, 
subjects were not allowed to respond until 1s had elapsed since a cue’s presentation.  The 
experiment contained different manipulations that should affect recollection, such as list length, 
number of presentations, and depth of encoding.  If it were true that recollection was a slow 
process, then manipulations that affect recollection should have a greater effect at longer 
decision times.  This was not observed in their study.   
 In addition, remember-know (RK: Tulving, 1985) studies fail to support the hypothesis 
that familiarity is faster than recollection.  The RK paradigm is a recognition task that requires 
subjects to identify how they based their memory decision.  When subjects indicate that a cue is 
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“old,” they can make either a “remember” (R) or a “know” (K) response. R indicates that the 
recognition judgment was accompanied by conscious recollection of details of the item during 
presentation (mapping onto recollection), while K indicates that a recognition judgment was not 
accompanied by such details (mapping onto familiarity).  If it is the case that familiarity is faster 
than recollection, we might expect K responses to be faster than R.  However, studies have 
shown the opposite to be true: R responses are faster than K  (Dewhurst & Conway, 1994; 
Dewhurst, Holmes, Brandt, & Dean, 2006).  
 Is it the case, then, that the hypothesis that familiarity is faster than recollection is 
incorrect?  There is no definitive conclusion for this, either, for some results observed in the false 
memory literature provide support for it.  In particular, the phenomenon of the inverted U shape 
of false memory over time can be explained by the idea that familiarity is fast and recollection is 
slow.  Brainerd, Reyna, Wright, & Mojardin (2003) proposed that the inverted U for false 
memory occurs because the process that supports false memory according to FTT (familiarity) is 
fast while the process that supports true memory (recollection) is slow.  They reported findings 
from studies where subjects studied a list of semantically related words and were later asked to 
make old/new decisions on targets (e.g. spruce, oak), related distractors (e.g. pine, maple), and 
unrelated distractors (e.g. car, bagpipe).  The old/new decisions were made after various time 
intervals, a standard response-signal procedure (Dosher, 1984).  A signal to respond was made to 
subjects after some lag (e.g. 250, 500, 750, 1,000, and 1,500msec) following probe presentation, 
and they were asked to make a decision within a brief interval following the signal (e.g. 
300msec).   Indeed, false memory to related distractors increased over time before decreasing to 
form an inverted U in this study.  Brainerd et al. (2003) argued that as fast familiarity initially 
increased without slow recollection, false alarm rates to related distractors increased, forming the 
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left arm of the curve. Then, as recollection became available, false alarms decreased over time, 
forming the right arm of the curve.   
The weakness in all of the designs that have been discussed thus far is that they are, 
ultimately, indirect measures of process speeds and rely heavily on inference.  In addition, all 
discussion on familiarity versus recollection assumes that recollection is a univariate process.  
However, as described in Experiment 1, dual-recollection theory introduces a bivariate model 
with two types of recollection: target and context recollection (Brainerd, Gomes, et al. 2014).  In 
semantic false memory designs, target recollection and context recollection supports true and 
false memory respectively, and it is unclear whether these two recollections have different time 
courses as well.  It could very well be the case that fast context recollection is responsible for the 
left arm of the inverted U curve of false memory, and that a mix of familiarity and target 
recollection is responsible for the right arm of the curve.  Without a way to directly measure 
process speeds, however, it is impossible with current inferential methods to determine if 
familiarity is faster than both forms of recollection, or whether context recollection is, in fact, 
faster than both familiarity and target recollection. 
Conjoint Recognition Latency Extension Model 
Latency extension models are able to answer the inverted U false memory phenomenon 
because they are able to directly measure the relative speeds of processes.  An appropriate model 
that can address the familiarity-recollection question needs two important characteristics.  First, 
it must be able to provide estimates for the processes in question: familiarity and the two 
recollections, target and context recollection.  Second, it must be able to estimate the relative 
speeds of each of these processes.  
 The conjoint recognition design for semantic false memory addresses both points.  As 
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described in Experiment 1, the conjoint recognition design has subjects study lists of 
semantically related words, and then take a memory test on targets, related distractors, and 
unrelated distractors that are paired with one of three possible probes.  The probes correspond 
with a verbatim retrieval condition (V: Was it a target?), a gist retrieval condition (G: Was it a 
related distractor?), and a verbatim and gist retrieval condition (VG: Was it a target or a related 
distractor?).  The conjoint recognition model itself has parameters associated with targets, related 
distractors, and unrelated distractors, described in more detail on Table 3.1.  There are three 
retrieval parameters for targets: identity judgment (I: a mix of both target and context 
recollection), erroneous recollection rejection (E: context recollection), and familiarity (S1).  
There are three retrieval parameters for related distractors: recollection rejection (R: target 
recollection), phantom recollection (P: context recollection), and familiarity (S2).  Finally, there 
are three bias parameters associated with unrelated distractors: bias for V probes (bV), bias for G 
probes (bG), and bias for VG probes (bVG).  For the purposes of testing relative speeds of 
familiarity and recollection, the conjoint recognition model clears the first criteria because it 
provides separate estimates of the two recollections and familiarity. 
Table 3.1 
Conjoint Recognition Model parameter definitions 
Parameter Definition 
Targets  
I Identity Judgment: A list item encourages the conscious reinstatement of 
its prior presentation, or the conscious reinstatement of the context it 
appeared in during encoding. Identity judgment promotes the acceptance 
of the item as having been a target, and thus supports its acceptance on V 
and VG probes, but not for G probes (target and context recollection). 
E Erroneous Recollection Rejection: A list item encourages gist-cued 
retrieval of verbatim traces of a different target, which results in the 
mistaken rejection of the target probe. This results in its rejection on V 




S1 Semantic Familiarity: A list item’s meaning provokes feelings of 
familiarity that are strong enough to allow it to be perceived as either a 
target or a related distractor.  Items that provoke familiarity but not identity 
judgment are accepted on V, G, and VG probes (familiarity).  
 
Related distractors  
 
R Recollection rejection: A related distractor (e.g. doctor) provokes the 
conscious reinstatement of corresponding targets (e.g. nurse), supporting 
its identification as a distractor and not a target.  Recollection rejection 
encourages distractors to be accepted on the G and VG probes, but not on 
V probes (target recollection) 
 
P Phantom recollection: A related distractor encourages the conscious 
reinstatement of the contextual details that accompanied corresponding 
targets.  Items that provoke the recollection of these contextual details are 
judged to be targets, thereby supporting its acceptance on V and VG 
probes, but not on G probes (context recollection) 
 
S2 Semantic Familiarity: A related distractor’s meaning provokes feelings of 
familiarity that are strong enough to allow it to be perceived as either a 
target or a related distractor.  Familiarity encourages acceptance of related 







bV Bias: high-threshold bias parameter for V probes 
 
bG Bias: high-threshold bias parameter for G probes 
 
bVG Bias: high-threshold bias parameter for VG probes 
 
 
 The second criteria can be cleared with a latency extension of the conjoint recognition 
model.  Methods on how to extend a multinomial model to include response latencies are 
discussed in detail by Heck and Erdfelder (2016, 2017).  The general idea behind latency 
extensions is that different cognitive responses that contribute to a discrete response are 
composed of mixtures of latency distributions attributed to each process.  When responses are 
binned as fast or slow (e.g. fast acceptance of a probe versus slow accept), the latency 
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distributions of the cognitive processes can be parameterized in a similar manner that the 
processes in the core model are parameterized.  In summary, the same mathematical procedure 
that is used to estimate parameters in the core model can be used to estimate relative speeds of 
those processes in the latency extended conjoint recognition model.  
 Extending the conjoint recognition model with two speeds of “fast” and “slow” yields a 
model with thirty-six latent reaction time distributions.  In order to make the model identifiable, 
some theoretically motivated assumptions were made with regards to the values of the latency 
parameters.  The first assumption is that the speed for accepting or rejecting a target or a related 
distractor based on bias is the same.  Second, examining the process trees for the V, G, and VG 
conditions for accepting a probe based on identity judgment, one can see that the tree structure is 
identical.  Therefore, the speed in which identity judgment becomes available must be assumed 
equal across the three conditions for the model to be identifiable.  The same is true for the other 
parameters, so that we are left with five latency parameters each associated with a retrieval 
process (LI, LS1, LR, LP, LS2), six bias latency parameters associated with list items and related 
distractors (LTbV, LTbG, LTbVG, LRDbV, LRDbG, LRDbVG), three bias latency parameters associated with 
accepting unrelated distractors (LbV, LbG, LbVG), and three bias latency parameters associated with 
rejecting unrelated distractors (L(1-bV), L(1-bG), L(1-bVG)).   
The full tree with all of the assumptions are available on Figure 3.1 (list items), Figure 
3.2 (related distractors), and Figure 3.3 (unrelated distractors).  In all three figures, the far left 
describes the probabilities of accepting cues with one of three probes (V, G, and VG).  The far 
right represents one of four possible response outcomes (fast-accept, slow-accept, fast-reject, 
slow-reject).  For the purposes of answering the question on whether recollection or familiarity is 










































targets, LI and LS1.  Recall that I, identity judgment, is a mixture of the two recollections, and S1 
is familiarity.  Comparing the two latency parameters for identity judgment and familiarity can 
be a test on whether or not the univariate recollection theory holds in its prediction that 
familiarity is faster than recollection.  The second comparison of interest, and the more 
interesting of the two, are between the latency parameters from related distractors, LR, LP, and 
LS2.  Recollection rejection R is target recollection, phantom recollection P is context 
recollection, and S2 is familiarity.  Comparing the relative speeds of these parameters provides a 
test to see if fast context recollection, P, is responsible for the left arm of the inverted U curve of 
false memory, and also whether or not there are any speed differences between target 
recollection and familiarity.  According to univariate theories of recollection, we would expect to 
see familiarity being faster than both forms of recollection in the model.  A bivariate recollection 
account is supported if context recollection is faster than familiarity, and context and target 





































































































































Figure 3.2. Latency extended conjoint recognition model trees for related distractors. 
Figure 3.3. Latency extended conjoint recognition model trees for unrelated distractors. 
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Dynamic Model of Memory 
I addressed how the new latency extended conjoint recognition model could directly 
measure memory process speeds and thus answer theoretical questions on their relative order, but 
it is important to discuss how this new model compares with some contemporary memory 
models that also incorporate the time-course of retrieval processes.  Cox and Shiffrin (2017) 
introduced the dynamic model of memory, which integrates information on how the changes in 
the familiarity index over time affects recognition judgments. 
 The dynamic model may be described as an extension of univariate models of memory.  
In this model, memory events contain two types of traces: content memory, which includes 
information specific to the event such as perceptual and semantic information, and context 
memory, which includes information surrounding the event such as its time, location, and 
temporal and positional relations to other events.  Both content and context memory make up a 
single metric of memory strength, called “familiarity.”  Note that this is different than familiarity 
defined in conjoint recognition, where familiarity is strictly a gist process that isn’t combined 
with target and context recollection, unlike how it’s defined in the dynamic model.   
Unlike classic univariate theories where positive recognition decisions are made on the 
basis of this familiarity reaching a certain threshold, the dynamic model emphasizes the changes 
of familiarity over time.  When a test probe is presented at t0, it initially only contains context 
features (i.e. the room the probe is presented in, where it is located on the screen, the time it’s 
presented).  The familiarity metric at t0 therefore reflects the overall match between the test 
context and the study context of targets stored in memory.  As time passes, content features 
stored in memory are sampled and matched with content features of the probe, and its familiarity 
increases or decreases depending on the results of the matching.  For example, the average 
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familiarity of targets will increase over time because more and more content features match the 
probe, whereas the average familiarity of distractors will decrease over time because the sampled 
content will not match the probe. 
 There are two predictions the dynamic model makes that are relevant to the present study 
on process latencies.  First, the dynamic model describes particular types of memory traces being 
available for memory decisions at different times, and that they are not dependent on 
manipulations that increase or decrease their strength (like target repetition).  According to Cox 
and Shiffrin, semantic content is accessed earlier than information surrounding the modality 
(auditory or visual presentation) or the plurality of the target.  Second, the inverted U function of 
false memory occurs because semantic content is accessed earlier than other traces.  Familiarity 
to related distractors initially increases due to fast semantic content sampling, and this 
contributes to the increase in false acceptances in early deadlines.  False acceptances decrease as 
deadlines decrease, because average familiarity decreases over time as more and more memory 
features mismatch the probe.  
 The prediction that semantic content is accessed quickly while other types of traces are 
accessed slowly is compatible to dual process predictions.  As stated before, dual recollection 
theory describes two types of recollection, target and context recollection, and that these two 
recollections may have different speeds.  Regarding the first point, dual recollection does not 
make any assumptions on whether or not certain memory processes are faster than others based 
on their strength.  Regarding the second point, fast phantom recollection may be responsible for 
the initial increase in false alarms at shorter deadlines, and prior research has shown that 
phantom recollection increases with increased gist.  It is possible, then, that it is not the case that 




 While both the dynamic model and the latency extended conjoint recognition model both 
provide a model-based explanation to the inverted U false memory curve, the latency extension 
model has two main advantages.  First, the dynamic model still cannot directly measure process 
speeds and relies on inferences.  The strength of the latency extension model is that it 
parameterizes process latencies, and allows statistical tests to be conducted to compare how fast 
one process is to another.  Second, because the dynamic model combines all types of memory 
traces into a single familiarity metric, it is not possible to identify what types of traces are 
accessed earlier than others using the model alone.  Latency extension models, on the other hand, 
are able to define the relative order of memory processes, and are therefore able to predict the 
kinds of manipulations that will be relevant in a recognition decision earlier or later than others.  





EXPERIMENT 2: TESTING THE LATENCY EXTENSION CONJOINT 
RECOGNITION MODEL  
There were two goals for Experiment 2.  The first goal was to apply the new latency 
modeling techniques to real data, and see if the extended model provides adequate fit to them.  
The second goal was to see if familiarity was faster than both forms of recollection: target and 
context.  According to the dual recollection theory, it is possible that faster phantom (context) 
recollection is responsible for greater false memory during shorter response intervals, rather than 
familiarity.  This is the first study to directly test the relative speeds of familiarity and the two 
forms of recollection against each other.  
 Experiment 3 is a study designed to specifically address some additional questions that 
arose from Experiment 2.  There were two goals for Experiment 3.  First, there may be some 
concern that imposing response deadlines affects the speed in which processes become available 
due to strategy.  In order to determine if the results of Experiment 2 can be applied to false 
memory studies with response deadlines imposed on them, it is necessary to run the same latency 
extension analysis on a response deadline study.  Second, analyzing response latency data in 
conjunction with the results from latency extension modeling may provide some insight into how 
fast the processes come online, rather than just their relative speeds. 
Method 
Participants 
Five datasets included conjoint recognition data from 188 introductory psychology 
students. There were 19 participants in dataset 1, 28 participants in dataset 2, 59 participants in 
dataset 3, 31 participants in dataset 4, and 23 participants in dataset 5.  One participant was 
 52 
 
removed from dataset 5 for a total of 22 participants, because they did not follow the instructions 
for the task correctly.  The students participated to fulfill a course requirement. 
Materials 
All five conditions used a standard conjoint recognition design using DRM lists (Deese, 
1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995).  Lists were chosen from a pool of 200 DRM lists 
aggregated from three different studies (Arndt, 2012; Brainerd & Wright, 2005; Flegal Atkins 
Reuter-Lorenz, 2010).  75 lists that produce the highest levels of false memory were pulled from 
Stadler et al.’s (1999) lists for study as well as additional lists from Roediger et al. (2001).  Each 
of the 75 lists were four words long. In dataset 1, 2, and 3, the four words were chosen randomly 
from the available DRM lists, and were not optimized on backward association strength (BAS).  
The average BAS for the study words in these experiments was 0.41.  In order to elevate false 
memory levels, dataset 4 and dataset 5 used study words with the highest BAS, and the average 
BAS for these conditions was 0.46. Because the experiment was divided into three different 
study-test cycles, there were a total of 25 lists of four items per study. The lists for each study 
were distributed randomly.  
 Each test was comprised of 75 items of three different cue types: 25 targets that had been 
presented during study, 25 critical distractors that were related to targets but were never 
presented, and 25 unrelated distractors that were neither presented at study nor related to targets.  
Therefore, across all three tests, 255 items were tested.  With the exception of dataset 4 and 
dataset 5, unrelated distractors were chosen from critical distractors from unused DRM lists.  For 
dataset 4 and dataset 5, unrelated distractors were high frequency abstract words that were 
chosen from the Toglia & Battig (1978) word norms.  The words that were chosen were not 
associated to any of the items presented at study.  
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Each cue word was factorially paired with one of three possible probes: “The word was 
presented on the list,” “The word was NOT presented but related to a word on the list,” “The 
word was NEITHER presented NOR related to a word on the list.” The conjoint recognition 
paradigm refers to these instructional conditions as “V: Verbatim”, “G: Gist”, and “VG: 
Verbatim or Gist” conditions.  Participants were asked to accept or reject each probe depending 
on whether they judged the statement to be true or false.  It is important to note that each study-
test cycle was independent of each other, so that an item on the third test was never associated 
with a word on a previous test.  Three versions of the test were created, with different 
randomizations of the study and test words in consideration of list-order effects. 
Procedure 
Participants for all conditions were informed that they would be taking part in a memory 
test and should try to remember the words presented to the best of their ability.  They were given 
instructions on both the study and test portions of the experiment prior to the start of the study, 
and they were also given sample problems to make sure they understood the task.  During the 
instructions, participants were warned that the memory test would include words that they had 
seen before as well as words that were new, and that they would have to make judgments on 
whether the episodic description attached to the cue was accurate.  They were specifically 
instructed to only accept a probe if they believed them to be true, and to reject them otherwise.  
The experiments took place electronically on a computer screen. 
 For all conditions except dataset 3, words during study were presented at a 2-s rate.  For 
dataset 3, they were presented at a 1-s rate.  Words were presented centered on the screen and 
printed in 72-point font.  Between each word, there was a 3-s inter stimulus interval where a 
black fixation cross was displayed on the center of the screen.  Each study took approximately 
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8.3 minutes to complete, with the exception of dataset 3 which took 4.15 minutes to complete.  
After study, there was a brief 3-minute break where the participant was briefed again on the 
instructions of the upcoming test.  The test portion followed if the participant had no questions or 
concerns.  Test probes were presented one at a time, and each probe was presented for 4 seconds 
during which time the participant had to make a response with a key press of ‘yes’ or ‘no.’  Each 
test portion took approximately 30 minutes to complete.  A summary of all of the differences and 
similarities across the five available conditions are provided on Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 
Experiment 2 methodological differences 
Dataset n Study Average BAS Unrelated Distractors 
   1 19 2s/word 
presentation 
0.41 critical words from unused DRM 
lists 
 
   2 28 2s/word 
presentation 
0.41 critical words from unused DRM 
lists 
 
   3 59 1s/word 
presentation 
0.41 critical words from unused DRM 
lists 
 
   4 31 2s/word 
presentation 
0.46 high frequency abstract words  
 
 
   5 23 2s/word 
presentation 






Latency Binning  
Latency extension models require data to be binned by response latencies.  That is, for 
every observable response probability that is included in an unextended model, they must be 
further discriminated by response latency.  For the purposes of this study, two latency bins, ‘fast’ 
and ‘slow’, were created for each cue-probe combination and response (e.g. fast target accept in 
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the V condition, slow target accept in the V condition, fast target reject in the V condition…).  
Latency boundaries for binning responses were determined by taking the reaction times of all 
responses, log-transforming them, identifying the median, and then converting the median back 
to the raw latency value and using it to separate fast and slow bins.  The binning methods were 
adopted from those discussed in Heck and Erdfelder (2016). 
Results and Discussion 
Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive stats for acceptance rates of each probe and descriptive stats for latencies of 
each probe is reported in Table 4.2.  Although not the main interest of the current experiment, 
this data provides a check to make sure the subjects were understanding the task and that the data 
does not deviate from previous conjoint recognition data.  In terms of the acceptance 
probabilities, the grand means were p(VG) = 0.78, p(V) = 0.74, and p(G) = 0.33 for targets, 
p(VG) = .72, p(G) = .61, and p(V) = .42 for related distractors, and p(VG) = .35, p(G) = .31, and 
p(V) = .20 for unrelated distractors.  To summarize, p(VG) > p(V) > p(G) for targets, p(VG) > 
p(G) > p(V) for related distractors, and p(VG) = p(G) > p(V) for unrelated distractors (the 
difference between VG and G acceptance probabilities were not significantly different for 





Mean Acceptance Probabilities (SDs) and Mean Accept and Reject Latencies (SDs) for the 9 Item X Probe Combinations of Experiments 1-6 
                   
            Experiment 
Item│probe type               
           Dataset 1         Dataset 2          Dataset 3          Dataset 4          Dataset 5         Mean  
                   
Probability: 
 RD│V        .31(.46)        .34(.47)         .38(.49)         .51(.50)         .57(.49)          .42  
 RD│G        .53(.50)        .58(.49)         .63(.48)         .64(.48)         .65(.48)          .61 
 RD│VG       .70(.46)        .70(.46)         .74(.44)         .68(.47)         .77(.42)          .72 
 T│V        .68(.47)        .77(.42)         .78(.42)         .65(.48)         .80(.40)          .74 
 T│G        .29(.45)        .29(.46)         .30(.46)         .52(.50)         .25(.43)          .33 
 T│VG        .77(.42)        .78(.42)         .82(.39)         .68(.47)         .83(.37)          .78 
 UD│V        .16(.37)        .19(.39)         .16(.36)         .27(.44)         .20(.40)          .20 
 UD│G        .32(.47)        .29(.45)         .26(.44)         .34(.47)         .34(.47)          .31 
 UD│VG       .36(.48)        .34(.47)         .30(.46)         .37(.48)         .38(.49)          .35 
Latency-accept: 
 RD│V        1.80(.69)        1.82(.66)         2.10(.77)         2.20(.71)         2.08(.83)          2.00  
 RD│G        2.06(.66)        2.15(.59)         2.31(.70)         2.25(.75)         2.36(.75)          2.23 
 RD│VG       1.86(.60)        1.92(.61)         2.06(.67)         2.24(.74)         2.04(.71)          2.02 
 T│V        1.51(.56)        1.59(.54)         1.69(.68)         1.90(.77)         1.71(.69)          1.68  
 T│G        1.89(.75)        1.99(.65)         2.20(.83)         2.12(.80)         2.23(.73)          2.01 
 T│VG        1.67(.54)        1.72(.57)         1.81(.66)         2.02(.78)         1.75(.62)          1.79 
 UD│V        1.65(.64)        1.83(.60)         2.10(.77)         2.35(.76)         2.10(.82)          2.01 
 UD│G        2.04(.66)        2.22(.57)         2.41(.72)         2.46(.77)         2.33(.77)          2.29 
 UD│VG       1.88(.65)        1.97(.59)         2.22(.73)         2.29(.78)         2.24(.74)          2.12 
Latency-reject: 
 RD│V        1.81(.60)        1.94(.57)         2.17(.68)         2.28(.73)         2.13(.69)          2.07 
 RD│G        2.03(.76)        2.05(.66)         2.35(.73)         2.39(.80)         2.41(.74)          2.25 
 RD│VG       1.72(.73)        1.91(.67)         2.19(.74)         2.33(.74)         2.29(.76)          2.09 
 T│V        1.67(.75)        1.85(.59)         2.08(.69)         2.24(.69)         2.12(.71)          1.99 
 T│G        1.94(.67)        2.01(.57)         2.23(.71)         2.41(.73)         2.20(.72)          2.16 
 T│VG        1.69(.79)        1.89(.59)         2.25(.69)         2.28(.77)         2.10(.73)          2.04 
 UD│V             1.70(.59)        1.81(.55)         1.93(.65)         2.21(.72)         1.90(.64)          1.91 
UD│G        2.02(.71)        2.08(.62)         2.35(.73)         2.41(.73)         2.39(.75)          2.25 




The distribution of responses parallel what has been found in prior conjoint recognition 
experiments. Brainerd et al. (2014) reviewed a corpus of 297 conjoint recognition data sets using 
semantically related and unrelated word lists like the methods in this experiment.  They found 
p(VG) > p(V) > p(G) for targets, p(VG) > p(G) > p(V) for related distractors, and p(VG) = p(G) 
> p(V) for unrelated distractors.  Therefore, the conjoint recognition data in the present 
experiment behaved in a way expected out of these kinds of experiments. 
Core Model Fit 
Before implementing the latency extension to the conjoint recognition model, it is 
necessary to first see if the model provides acceptable fits to the data.  The conjoint recognition 
model contains three parameters for targets (I, E, ST), three parameters for distractors (R, P, SD), 
and three parameters for bias (bv, bg, bvg) for a total of nine.  The present design provides nine 
free probabilities with which to estimate them.  Because erroneous recollection rejection 
generally has very low values, E was assumed to be zero in order to have an unsaturated model 
with which to run fit tests.  Therefore, the fit test for this model to determine if it is acceptable to 
account for the response probabilities is a G2(1) statistic, with a critical value 3.84 to reject the 
null hypothesis of fit at the 0.05 level.  All five datasets provided acceptable fits to this model, 
and the null hypothesis could not be rejected.  Fit statistics and parameter estimates of the core 









Maximum likelihood estimates of the Conjoint Recognition Model’s retrieval and bias 
parameters for Experiment 2 datasets 
Dataset        





 G2 df I S1 R P S2 bV bG bVG 
    1 .24 1 .46 .31 .28 .21 .15 .16 .32 .37 
    2 2.60 1 .49 .40 .29 .14 .26 .19 .29 .33 
    3 .02 1 .51 .46 .32 .12 .39 .16 .26 .30 
    4 .44 1 .16 .42 .12 .03 .41 .27 .34 .36 
    5 .08 1 .60 .40 .14 .14 .56 .18 .33 .38 
 
 
Latency Extension Model Fit 
The core model is a 3 (probe: V, G, VG) × 3 (cue: target, related distractor, unrelated 
distractor) factorial structure with a total of 9 different conditions.  In each of these 9 conditions, 
responses are binned into four different probability outcomes: accept fast, accept slow, reject 
fast, reject slow.  Of these four probabilities, three are free to vary, and thus the latency extension 
model has 27 free empirical probabilities.  Five degrees of freedom are used for latency 
parameters associated with each of the retrieval parameters, (LI, LS1, LR, LP, LS2). Twelve more 
degrees of freedom are used for the latency parameters associated with various bias parameters, 
for a total of 17 degrees of freedom.  With these constraints, the test of fit is a G2(10) statistic 
that is asymptotically distributed as X2 with a critical value of 18.31 to reject the null hypothesis 
at the .05 level.  




  Model fits were adequate for three out of five data sets.  Similar to procedures in Experiment 1, 
a test for individual differences was conducted for the condition where fit failed.  The test for 
individual differences is a X2 statistic of the following form (Smith & Batchelder, 2008):  
X2(N – 1) = ∑ {(𝑅
𝑁
𝑖=1 i
 – Re)2 / Re} + (M – Ri – Re*)2 / Re*}  (16) 
Each individual differences test is applied to each cue-probe combination at a particular latency 
speed, for a total of 36 tests per data set.  In the above equation, N is equal to the number of 
subjects. M is the total number of examples of a particular cue-probe combination that 
Table 4.4 
Maximum likelihood estimates of the Conjoint Recognition Model’s latency parameters for 
Experiment 2 datasets 
Dataset         
   Latency-retrieval 
 G2 df LI LS1 LR LP LS2  
    1 7.79 10 .72 .69 .30 .54 .47  
    2 11.44 10 .71 .67 .44 .86 .42  
    3 62.42 10 .72 .67 .50 1.00 .37  
    4 2.49 10 .71 .63 .47 1.00 .43  
    5 36.71 10 .71 .70 .52 .89 .53  
Mean   .71 .67 .45 .86 .44  
   Latency-list items Latency-related distractors 
   LTbV LTbG LTbVG LRDbV LRDbG LRDbVG 
    1 7.79 10 .63 .02 .69 .68 .50 .64 
    2 11.44 10 .57 .00 .54 .50 .33 .52 
    3 62.42 10 .53 .00 .43 .40 .15 .44 
    4 2.49 10 .54 .00 .53 .45 .00 .44 
    5 36.71 10 .54 .32 .49 .44 .40 .42 
Mean   .56 .07 .54 .49 .28 .49 
 
   Latency-bias (accept 
unrelated distractors) 
Latency-bias (reject unrelated 
distractors)  
   LbV LbG LbVG L(1-bV) L(1-bG) L(1-bVG) 
    1 7.79 10 .60 .31 .40 .63 .44 .43 
    2 11.44 10 .53 .28 .44 .58 .38 .42 
    3 62.42 10 .50 .30 .44 .62 .34 .44 
    4 2.49 10 .67 .28 .38 .59 .33 .44 
    5 36.71 10 .42 .35 .49 .49 .39 .43 
Mean   .54 .30 .43 .58 .38 .43 
 60 
 
participants respond to (e.g. target in the V condition).  Ri is the number of cases a particular cue-
probe combination at a particular latency with a particular response was observed for a 
participant (e.g. fast accept of a target in the V condition).  Re is ∑ [𝑅𝑁𝑖 i ]/ N, and Re* = M – Re.  
For N = 25, the critical value of X2 to reject the null hypothesis of no individual differences at the 
.05 level was 37.70.   
For both dataset 3 and dataset 5, significant individual differences were observed in the 
data, with dataset 3 failing all 36 tests and dataset 5 failing all but two.  Therefore, because it is 
likely that model fits failed for these two experiments because of large individual differences 
between subjects, it is necessary to move on to hierarchical models which may account for them 
(Pratte & Rouder, 2010).  Hierarchical model analysis involves running the latency-extended 
conjoint recognition model for each individual subject and observing fits.  The average fit for all 
59 subjects in dataset 3 for 10 degrees of freedom was 13.33, with 79.66% of the subjects 
showing adequate fit.  The average fit for 22 subjects in dataset 5 for 10 degrees of freedom was 
11.56, with 86.36% of the subjects showing adequate fit.  Therefore, we can conclude that under 
the hierarchical model, fit was adequate for both dataset 3 and dataset 5, and that fit failed not 
because the model was inaccurate but because there were large individual differences in the data.  
Further discussion regarding the parameter estimates was therefore made under the assumption 
that the initial latency extension model was correct. 
Process Speeds 
Likelihood ratio tests (LRT) were run to determine if parameter estimates were 
significantly different from each other in each dataset.  In these tests, we constrain the model 
being used so that the two parameters we want to test against each other are equal.  We then take 
a look at the G2 value and compare model fits of this new constrained model to the unconstrained 
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model.  The test statistic is computed by subtracting the fit statistic of the unconstrained model 
from the constrained model, and the resulting difference is a statistic asymptotically distributed 
as X2, with df equal to the difference in free parameters between the two models (for the current 
experiments, df = 1).  
 There were three notable results from the significance tests to determine the relative 
speed of memory processes compared to each other.  For retrieval processes involving targets, 
there were no significant differences in process speeds for identity judgement, I, and familiarity, 
S1, for all experiments.  For retrieval processes involving related distractors, phantom 
recollection, P, was faster than recollection rejection, R, for all of the datasets except for dataset 
4 where there was no significant difference (dataset 1: G2(1)=8.08, dataset 2: G2(1) = 11.19, 
dataset 3: G2(1)=31.00, dataset 5: G2(1)=21.05). P was also faster than familiarity, S2, in two of 
the datasets (dataset 3: G2(1)=24.14, dataset 5: G2(1)=15.98).  Finally, there was no significant 
difference in the speed of R and S2 in all of the datasets except for dataset 3, where it was faster 
G2(1)=5.39.  In summary, identity judgment and familiarity for targets become available at 
around the same speed, and phantom recollection is the fastest process for related distractors 
compared to familiarity and recollection rejection.   
 The same type of analysis was conducted on latency for bias for accepting and rejecting 
unpresented unrelated distractors to see if there were bias-related differences in accepting or 
rejecting items across conditions (V, G, VG) when memory process-related traces cannot be 
retrieved.  Latency of the bias parameter on accept conditions were faster in the V condition than 
the G condition in all of the datasets (dataset 1: G2(1)=16.43, dataset 2: G2(1) = 17.39, dataset 3: 
G2(1)=23.28, dataset 5: G2(1)=34.71) except for dataset 4.  They were also faster in the V 
condition than the VG condition for dataset 1 (G2(1)=8.02) and dataset 5 (G2(1)=19.63), but were 
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not significantly different for the others.  Latency of the bias parameter on accept conditions 
were faster in the VG condition compared to the G condition for all datasets (dataset 2: 
G2(1)=10.69, dataset 3: G2(1)=16.88, dataset 4: G2(1)=10.09, dataset 5: G2(1)=4.20) except for 
dataset 1 where there was no significant difference.  Therefore, the general pattern is that 
responses for accepting an unpresented distractor on the basis of bias was fastest for the V 
condition and slowest for the G condition.   
 Latency of the bias parameters on reject conditions also painted a similar picture.  
Latency of the bias parameter on reject conditions were faster in the V condition than the G 
condition on all of the datasets (dataset 1: G2(1)=24.71, dataset 2: G2(1)=35.26, dataset 3: 
G2(1)=160.05, dataset 4: G2(1)=8.93, dataset 5: G2(1)=51.56).  Rejecting bias was also faster in 
the V condition compared to the VG condition in all datasets except for dataset 4 (dataset 1: 
G2(1)=27.11, dataset 2: G2(1)=22.02, dataset 3: G2(1)=66.34, dataset 5: G2(1)=16.59).  Last, 
rejecting bias in the VG condition was faster than in the G condition for dataset 3 (G2(1)=18.36) 
and dataset 5 (G2(1)=8.87), and no significant difference in the other datasets. Again, V 
conditions had the fastest latency times and G conditions had the slowest. 
 To summarize, consistent patterns emerged across all 6 conjoint recognition experiments 
for process speeds.  For retrieval processes for targets, identity judgment was roughly the same 
speed as familiarity.  For related distractors, phantom recollection was the fastest for all 
experiments, while recollection rejection and familiarity were the slowest.  For bias parameters, 
rejecting an item was generally faster than accepting an item, and responses to items in the V 
condition and VG condition were fastest while responses to items in the G condition were the 
slowest.  The finding that phantom recollection is faster than familiarity supports the dual 
recollection hypothesis that faster phantom (context) recollection is responsible for the left arm 
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of the inverted U function of false alarm over time.  This is different than prior assumptions in 






EXPERIMENT 3: PHANTOM RECOLLECTION AS A FAST PROCESS 
We saw in Experiment 2 that a latency extension can be applied to the conjoint 
recognition model with acceptable fits, and that it provided evidence that a fast recollective 
process (phantom recollection) and not familiarity was responsible for the inverted U curve of 
false memory.  The goal of Experiment 3 was to test two follow-up questions from Experiment 
2.  First, are the relative speed of memory processes consistent when we impose response 
deadlines in recognition experiments, or are they dependent on this experimental manipulation? 
Second, if phantom recollection is the fast process responsible for elevated false memory at fast 
response latencies, then can we observe greater values of phantom recollection compared to 
familiarity at earlier deadlines? 
Method 
Participants 
189 introductory psychology students were recruited for course credit.  Each participant 
was randomly selected to one of three conjoint recognition conditions (V, G, and VG), and for 
two response time conditions (timed and untimed). For the timed conditions, there were 37 
participants in the V condition, 36 in the G condition, and 33 in the VG condition. For the 
untimed conditions, there were 27 participants in the V condition, 28 in the G condition, and 28 
in the VG condition.   
Materials 
The design was similar to the format of Experiment 2 with a few key changes.  First, the 
conjoint recognition instructional condition was between-subjects (for V, G, VG). The conjoint 
recognition instructions were the same as those presented in Experiment 2.  Second, whether 
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subjects answered test probes under a response deadline or not was also a between-subject 
manipulation.  30 DRM lists were selected from the Roediger et al. (2001) norms, and the lists 
that produced the highest false memories were identified and prioritized using Stadler’s (1999) 
norms.  From these 30 lists, 12 words with the highest BAS were chosen as targets for the study 
list, and the mean BAS was 0.34.   
For the test list, there were 30 critical distractors, one each from the 30 DRM lists that 
were presented during study.  30 targets were chosen randomly, one from each list.  Last, 30 
unrelated distractors were chosen from critical distractors from unused lists from the Roediger 
norms.  Because there weren't enough DRM lists in the 12-word DRM norms, the remaining 
words were chosen from a large pool of 200 DRM lists aggregated from three different studies 
that were used in Experiment 2 (Flegal Atkins Reuter-Lorenz, 2010; Arndt, 2012; Brainerd & 
Wright, 2005). 
Like Experiment 2, Experiment 3 also had three different study-test cycles, and like 
Experiment 2, each study-test cycle was independent of each other.  Therefore, there were 10 
DRM lists (120 words) per study, and 10 targets, 10 critical distractors, and 10 unrelated 
distractors per test.  Three different test versions were created with different DRM lists selected 
randomly to appear on either the first, second, or third study-test cycle.  For the timed condition, 
there were five different response deadlines for the test: 100ms, 300ms, 500ms, 750ms, 1000ms.  
Therefore, there were 6 test items for each deadline condition (e.g. 6 targets at 100ms, 6 targets 
at 300ms… 6 unrelated distractors at 1000ms). 
Procedure 
At the beginning of the experiment, participants were told that they would 
be taking part in a memory test and should try to remember the words presented to the best of 
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their ability.  For the study portion, words were presented centered on the screen and printed in 
72-point font at a 2-s rate.  Between each study word a fixation cross was presented centered on 
the screen for 200ms.  Each study took approximately 4 minutes to complete.  
After study, they were given detailed instructions of the memory test, including examples 
of the conjoint recognition instructions to make sure they understood the task.  They were 
warned that the memory test would include words that they had seen, as well as words that were 
new, and that they would have to make judgments on whether or not the conjoint recognition 
instructional condition they were assigned to (V, G, or VG) reflected the cue accurately.  They 
were specifically instructed to only accept a probe if they believed them to be true, and to reject 
them otherwise.  Participants were also given a short five-word practice test so that they would 
know what to expect regarding response times.   
 In the timed condition, participants were instructed that during the test, a word would be 
presented for a brief period, followed by a tone indicating that they could make their memory 
response.  It was stressed that they should only make responses after the tone, and that they 
should also respond as fast as possible immediately upon hearing it.  Responses were made by 
either pressing a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ key on a keyboard.  Depending on the condition, the tone would be 
played at 100ms, 300ms, 500ms, 750ms, or 1000ms after the cue was presented on the screen, 
after which the word would disappear.  If a response key was pressed within 300ms after the 
tone, participants saw a green colored text with their reaction time. If they responded after 
300ms, they saw a red colored text with a message telling them that they were too slow. 
 The untimed condition was the same as the timed condition, except with two changes 
reflecting the lack of deadlines.  First, there was no tone indicating that participants should 
respond, and they were not instructed about this tone.  Second, they received no feedback on 
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how quickly they made a response, and instead saw a black fixation cross centered on the screen 
between each test item. The test was completed in a self-paced manner similar to standard DRM 
experiments without response deadlines. 
Latency Binning 
The same latency binning procedure used in Experiment 2 was used for Experiment 3.  
Because there were six between-subject response deadline conditions (100ms, 300ms, 500ms, 
750ms, 1000ms, untimed), six different latency boundaries were calculated for each condition 
separately.  For each deadline condition, reaction times of all responses were log-transformed, 
the median of the log-transformed reaction times was identified, and then the median was 
converted back to the raw latency value and was used as the boundary to separate fast and slow 
bins.  Latency boundaries were calculated separately for each condition to avoid ceiling and floor 
effects for responses in the extreme deadline conditions (e.g. 100ms and 1000ms), where all 
responses are binned as fast or slow, and thus no estimates can be made for process latencies. 
Results and Discussion 
Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for acceptance rates of each probe and descriptive statistics for 
latencies of each probe are reported in Table 5.1.  Similar to Experiment 2, acceptance 
probabilities were well-behaved, indicating that the subjects understood the task properly.  The 
grand means for the six timing conditions were p(VG) = .77, p(V) = .60, and p(G) = .47 for 
targets, p(VG) = .81, p(G) = .65, and p(V) = .40 for related distractors, and p(VG) = .26, p(G) = 
.30, and p(V) = .11 for unrelated distractors.  To summarize, p(VG) > p(V) > p(G) for targets, 
p(VG) > p(G) > p(V) for related distractors, and p(VG) = p(G) > p(V) for unrelated distractors 
(the difference between VG and G acceptance probabilities were not significantly different for 
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unrelated distractors: mean difference=.04, SE=.05, p=.41). Again, the distributions in 
Experiment 3 paralleled prior distributions of acceptance probabilities in conjoint recognition 
experiments. 
 Bias corrected (two-high-threshold method; 2HT) acceptance rates for targets and related 
distractors are reported on Table 5.2.  To see if there were any trends in acceptance rates across 
the five timed conditions, a 3 (instruction: V/G/VG) × 5 (response deadline: 
100ms/300ms/500ms/750ms/1000ms) × 2 (probe: targets vs. related distractors) ANOVA was 
conducted on bias corrected acceptance rates for targets and related distractors.  There was a 
main effect of Deadline, F(4, 412) = 7.88, p<0.001, partial η2 = 0.07, where longer deadlines had 
higher acceptance rates than shorter deadlines.  There was also a main effect of Instruction, F(1, 
103) = 19.76, p<0.001, partial η2 = 0.28, where VG instructions had higher acceptance rates than 
V or G instructions, and V instructions had higher acceptance rates than G instructions.  
 Three significant interactions were observed.  There was a two-way Probe × Instruction 
interaction, F(2, 103)=39.26, p<0.001, partial η2 = 0.43.  For targets, there was a greater 
acceptance rate for V and VG instructional conditions compared to the G condition.  For related 
distractors, however, there was a greater acceptance rate for the VG condition compared to both 
V and G conditions, but there was no difference in acceptance rates between V and G conditions.  
There was also a two-way Deadline × Probe interaction, F(4, 412)=6.84, p<0.001, partial 
η2 =0.06.  While there was no significant difference in accepting targets across all timing 
conditions, accepting related distractors increased over time.  Last, there was a three-way 
Deadline × Probe × Instruction interaction, F(8, 412)=6.50, p<0.001, partial η2 =0.11.  For V 
condition for targets, there was a greater acceptance rate with longer deadlines, but no such trend 
was observed for related distractors.  For G and VG conditions the reverse was true, with greater 
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Mean Acceptance Probabilities (SDs) and Mean Accept and Reject Latencies (SDs) for the 9 Item X Probe Combinations of 6 deadline conditions 
                    
           Response Deadlines 
Item│probe type                    
            100ms         300ms          500ms          750ms         1000ms              none         Mean  
                    
Probability: 
 RD│V        .45(.28)        .46(.21)         .47(.27)         .39(.22)         .39(.26)         .23(.22)           .40 
 RD│G        .49(.21)        .65(.22)         .64(.18)         .76(.19)         .68(.23)         .70(.22)           .65 
 RD│VG       .77(.18)        .81(.18)         .80(.21)         .83(.14)         .81(.23)         .85(.18)           .81 
 T│V        .53(.26)        .58(.16)         .62(.25)         .52(.17)         .64(.21)         .68(.18)           .60 
 T│G        .52(.22)        .52(.20)         .54(.23)         .38(.20)         .38(.22)         .28(.18)           .47 
 T│VG        .78(.21)        .80(.14)         .78(.22)         .70(.18)         .77(.20)         .81(.20)           .77 
 UD│V        .16(.20)        .17(.21)         .13(.15)         .07(.14)         .08(.13)         .05(.10)           .11 
 UD│G        .35(.21)        .33(.24)         .41(.20)         .24(.22)         .28(.23)         .21(.20)           .30 
 UD│VG       .38(.30)        .32(.24)         .31(.25)         .16(.21)         .26(.19)         .13(.15)           .26 
Latency-accept (in seconds): 
 RD│V        .52(.27)        .61(.08)         .90(.38)         1.16(.79)         1.28(.18)         1.67(.77)           1.02 
 RD│G        .49(.11)        .61(.08)         .86(.22)         1.07(.26)         1.29(.15)         1.95(.54)           1.05 
 RD│VG       .45(.08)        .61(.15)         .79(.19)         1.01(.15)         1.33(.31)         1.32(.38)           .92 
 T│V        .50(.19)        .57(.09)         .79(.26)         1.03(.18)         1.40(.61)         1.51(.48)           .97  
 T│G        .47(.09)        .62(.15)         .82(.15)         1.11(.28)         1.28(.21)         2.32(1.00)           1.10 
 T│VG        .44(.08)        .62(.16)         .77(.09)         1.09(.20)         1.28(.16)         1.48(.52)           .95 
 UD│V        .49(.11)        .62(.20)         .78(.31)         1.61(1.44)       1.42(.47)         1.61(.79)           1.09 
 UD│G        .48(.11)        .60(.12)         .81(.17)         1.03(.14)         1.29(.16)         2.27(.85)           1.08 
 UD│VG       .45(.12)        .63(.18)         .98(.87)         1.10(.24)         1.34(.37)         1.70(.70)           1.03 
Latency-reject (in seconds): 
 RD│V        .50(.12)        .62(.09)         .80(.15)         1.02(.11)         1.31(.30)        1.68(.61)           .99 
 RD│G        .49(.11)        .62(.11)         .80(.16)         1.01(.33)         1.24(.13)         2.10(.88)           1.04 
 RD│VG       .47(.15)        .61(.13)         .84(.18)         1.70(2.31)        1.27(.12)         1.89(.87)           1.13 
 T│V        .48(.14)        .62(.15)         .81(.17)         1.26(.34)         1.26(.17)         1.78(.94)           1.04 
 T│G        .52(.12)        .64(.14)         .77(.10)         1.29(.58)         1.32(.32)         2.01(.56)           1.09 
 T│VG        .44(.09)        .62(.10)         .77(.11)         1.33(1.22)       1.29(.18)         2.00(.84)           1.08 
 UD│V             .48(.09)        .62(.20)         .77(.14)         1.04(.19)         1.29(.17)         1.50(.44)           .95 
UD│G        .51(.11)        .60(.12)         .84(.25)         1.09(.48)         1.35(.22)         2.30(.70)           1.12 
 UD│VG       .51(.08)        .63(.18)         .77(.09)         1.01(.10)         1.30(.15)         1.93(.72)           1.03 













Bias-Corrected Mean Acceptance Probabilities (SDs) for the 9 Item X Probe Combinations of 6 deadline conditions 
                    
           Response Deadlines 
Item│probe type                    
            100ms         300ms          500ms          750ms         1000ms              none        Mean  
                    
Probability: 
 RD│V        .29(.32)        .29(.28)         .34(.29)         .32(.21)         .31(.23)         .18(.22)           .29 
 RD│G        .14(.24)        .31(.31)         .24(.29)         .52(.27)         .41(.32)         .49(.31)           .35 
 RD│VG       .39(.31)        .49(.30)         .49(.28)         .66(.25)         .56(.34)         .72(.27)           .55 
 T│V        .36(.31)        .41(.29)         .49(.33)         .45(.22)         .55(.26)         .63(.21)           .48 
 T│G        .17(.31)        .19(.22)         .13(.28)         .14(.29)         .10(.25)         .08(.26)           .14 







Although results from the ANOVA do not show significant differences in false alarm 
acceptance rates in the three-way interaction, the shape of the trend is still consistent with prior 
literature in that false-positives to probes follows an inverted U-shape function.  For related 
distractors, bias-corrected acceptance rates in the V condition increases, and then decreases after 
deadlines longer than 500ms (100ms=0.29, 300ms=0.29, 500ms=0.34, 750ms=0.32, 
1000ms=0.31).  It is also worth noting that incorrectly accepting targets in the G condition 
follows a similar inverted-U curve as well (100ms=0.17, 300ms=0.19, 500ms=0.13, 
750ms=0.14, 1000ms=0.10).  Key interest would be to see if changes in parameter estimates 
occur after the 500ms deadline condition. 
Core Model Fit 
The conjoint recognition model was fit to the six deadline conditions to see if the base 
model provided acceptable fits to the data.  In Experiment 2, the model was made estimable by 
assuming that erroneous recollection rejection, E, was inconsequential and therefore set to zero.  
In the present experiment, however, this assumption could not be made, as the values for E were 
consistently high and thus resulted in poor fit.  Out of the six deadline conditions, only one 
provided acceptable fits (1000ms condition; G2(1)=2.37), and fit for an omnibus test with 6 
degrees of freedom and critical value of 12.59 also failed (G2(6)=59.92).   
Another assumption that is often made with the conjoint recognition model is to assume 
that the bias parameters for the G and VG conditions are equal.  Using this adjustment, fits were 
acceptable for all conditions except for the untimed condition.  The omnibus test with 6 degrees 
of freedom and critical value of 12.59 failed when the untimed condition was included 
(G2(6)=19.33), but was acceptable when only looking at conditions where participants were 
under a deadline, for a test with 5 degrees of freedom and a critical value of 11.07 (G2(5)=8.27).  
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Running a test of individual differences to see if large variations in responses across individual 
subjects contributed to fit failure in the untimed condition revealed that subjects in the untimed 
condition had significant differences in responses for all instructional conditions.  A hierarchical 
model analysis could not be implemented for Experiment 3 because conjoint recognition 
instructional conditions were run between subjects.  Therefore, the bulk of the latency extension 
modeling results will focus on the conditions where response deadlines were imposed. 
Latency Extension Model Fit 
The core model is a 3 (probe: V, G, VG) × 3 (cue: target, related distractor, unrelated 
distractor) factorial structure with a total of 9 different conditions.  In each of these 9 conditions, 
responses are binned into four different probability outcomes: accept fast, accept slow, reject 
fast, reject slow.  Of these four probabilities, three are free to vary, and thus the latency extension 
model has 27 free empirical probabilities.  Six degrees of freedom are used for latency 
parameters associated with each of the retrieval parameters, (LI, LE, LS1, LR, LP, LS2), and twelve 
are used for latency parameters associated with various bias parameters for a total of 9 degrees of 
freedom left for model fitting.  Therefore, the test of fit is a G2(9) statistic that is asymptotically 
distributed as X2 with a critical value of 16.92 to reject the null hypothesis at the .05 level.  
Results of the latency extension are summarized on Table 6.4.  Model fits were adequate for all 
five deadline conditions. 
Core Model Parameter Estimates 
Parameter estimates for the core model are reported on Table 5.3.  LRTs were run to 
determine if parameter estimates were significantly different from each other in each deadline, 





For the three retrieval processes for targets, there were two deadlines in which S1 was 
significantly greater than I (300ms: G2(1)=4.32, 500ms: G2(1)=9.65), two deadlines in which S1 
was significantly greater than E (300ms: G2(1)=3.86, 500ms: G2(1)=11.70), and three deadlines 
in which I was significantly greater than E (500ms: G2(1)=4.56, 750ms: G2(1)=4.23, 1000ms: 
G2(1)=12.39).  These patterns are consistent with prior experiments where models with E=0 was 
used, because while E could not be disregarded for the present study, it was still lower than the 
other memory processes involved in target recollection.  It is also interesting to note that S1 is 
greater than I in the two deadlines before 750ms.  S1 is a process that supports false alarms for 
targets, and incorrectly accepting targets for the G condition increased up to 500ms and then 
decreased after.  It is possible that greater values of S1 at these earlier deadlines contributed to the 
left arm of the inverted U function in falsely accepting targets in the G condition over time.   
 For the three retrieval processes for related distractors, P was greater than R for the 
fastest deadline (100ms: G2(1)=5.47), but was smaller for the two longest deadlines (750ms: 
G2(1)=21.09, 1000ms: G2(1)=8.93).  S2 was greater than P for all deadlines except the fastest 
(300ms: G2(1)=4.14, 500ms: G2(1)=5.26, 750ms: G2(1)=14.87, 1000ms: G2(1)=5.52), and was 
Table 5.3 
Maximum likelihood estimates of the Conjoint Recognition Model’s retrieval and bias 
parameters for Experiment 3  
Deadline         





 G2 df I E S1 R P S2  bV bG-VG 
100ms 0.44 1 .26 .24 .38 .25 .37 .23  .16 .36 
300ms 0.16 1 .27 .23 .46 .31 .23 .47  .17 .33 
500ms 3.72 1 .24 .11 .49 .26 .21 .46  .13 .36 
750ms 3.70 1 .31 .18 .32 .41 .11 .59  .07 .20 
1000ms 0.25 1 .39 .13 .41 .38 .19 .49  .08 .27 
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smaller than R for two deadlines (500ms: G2(1)=5.27, 750ms: G2(1)=5.86).  The results confirm 
predictions from Experiment 2 that phantom recollection is greater than the other retrieval 
processes at fast deadlines, and was therefore responsible for the left arm of the inverted U 
function in false alarms over time.  Familiarity also increases above phantom recollection by the 
300ms deadline, further contributing to the left arm of the inverted U, before false alarms begin 
to decrease after the 500ms mark with recollection rejection increasing above familiarity and 
phantom recollection.  This fits with the observation that false alarm rates appear to decrease 
after the 500ms deadline. 
 Levels of parameter estimates differed across the five deadlines.  An omnibus test with a 
null hypothesis 100ms=300ms=500ms=750ms=1000ms with a G2(4) statistic with a critical 
value of 9.49 was run for each of the 6 memory parameters (I, E, S1, P, R, S2) and two bias 
parameters (bV, bG-VG).  This test produced null hypothesis rejections for three parameters:   
S2 (22.33), bV (17.56), and bG-VG (38.41).  Therefore, there is a significant trend in the increase of 
S2 as response deadlines get longer, and a significant trend in the decrease of both bias 
parameters as response deadlines get longer.  Although there were no significant differences in 
the levels of the other parameters, it is still worth noting that there were general linear trends as 
deadlines increased.  For example for targets, E seemed to steadily decrease with longer 
deadlines, while I seemed to steadily increase with longer deadlines.  For related distractors, P 
seemed to steadily decrease with longer deadlines, while R seemed to steadily increase with 
longer deadlines.  There is a parallel decrease in E for targets and P for related distractors (Figure 
5.1) that suggest that they both measure the same context recollection process.  Visual 














































Figure 5.1. Parameter estimates for target and related distractor retrieval 







Parameter estimates of the latency extended model are reported on Table 5.4. LRTs were 
run to see if the latency parameter estimates in each of the five deadline conditions were 
significantly different from each other.  Recall that in Experiment 2 where no deadline was  
imposed during the recognition task, two main patterns emerged: 1.) no differences were 
Table 5.4 
 
Maximum likelihood estimates of the Conjoint Recognition Model’s latency parameters for 
Experiment 3 
Dataset          
    Latency-retrieval 
 G2 df LI LE LS1 LR LP LS2  
100ms 0.54 9 .68 1.00 .30 .85 .81 .10  
300ms 0.24 9 .68 .84 .56 .72 .88 .27  
500ms 3.75 9 .61 .30 .50 .68 .54 .42  
750ms 3.82 9 .66 .38 .70 .81 1.00 .56  
1000ms 0.42 9 .64 .00 .71 .53 .41 .65  
    Latency-list items Latency-related distractors 
   LTbV LTbG LTbVG LRDbV LRDbG LRDbVG 
100ms 0.54 9 .35 .04 .57 .21 .03 .49 
300ms 0.24 9 .35 .00 .28 .16 .06 .35 
500ms 3.75 9 .57 .40 .42 .41 .28 .43 
750ms 3.82 9 .34 .44 .40 .21 .43 .53 
1000ms 0.42 9 .64 .64 .42 .25 .59 .32 
    Latency-bias (accept 
unrelated distractors) 
Latency-bias (reject 
unrelated distractors)  
   LbV LbG LbVG L(1-bV) L(1-bG) L(1-bVG) 
100ms 0.54 9 .44 .49 .67 .47 .40 .25 
300ms 0.24 9 .39 .44 .50 .56 .49 .43 
500ms 3.75 9 .64 .40 .51 .59 .47 .48 
750ms 3.82 9 .38 .69 .50 .71 .64 .70 
1000ms 0.42 9 .50 .49 .38 .52 .48 .37 
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observed between the relative speeds of identity judgment, I, and familiarity, S1 and 2.) phantom 
recollection, P, was faster than familiarity, S2, and recollection rejection, R.  A consistent pattern 
emerged for the present experiment.  Regarding identity judgment and familiarity, there were no 
significant differences in their relative speeds for all conditions, similar to results from 
Experiment 2.  Regarding parameters for related distractors, phantom recollection was faster than 
familiarity in two deadline conditions (100ms: G2(1)=3.92, 300ms: G2(1)=4.22), and was not 
significantly different from familiarity in the remaining conditions.  Unlike Experiment 2, where 
P was also significantly faster than R, none of the timed conditions had significant differences in 
P and R.  Recollection rejection was faster than familiarity in one out of six deadline conditions 
(300ms: G2(1)=4.10).  The results are consistent with Experiment 2 in that identity judgment is 
the generally the same speed as familiarity, and phantom recollection is generally faster than 
both recollection rejection and familiarity. 
Unlike in Experiment 2, the relative speed of E could be measured in Experiment 3, 
because the core model accounted for it.  There were no significant differences in process speed 
for E compared to I or S1 except for one deadline condition.  In the 100ms deadline condition, E 
was faster than I (G2(1)=4.44) and S1 (G
2(1)=5.05).  This is consistent with the finding that 
context recollection processes are faster than familiarity or target recollection. 
There may be a concern that the results of the latency parameters are affected by the 
binning methods, or that they do not reflect latency but rather reflect the strength of the core 
memory processes.  Both of these concerns can be refuted by the data.  First, regarding the 
concern that the latency parameters are affected by the binning methods; even though the binning 
boundaries were calculated separately for each timing condition, the overall results of the relative 
order of memory processes were the same.  If the results were affected by binning methods, then 
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we may expect to see more variability in the results for process speeds.  Second, regarding the 
concern that the latency parameters reflect core memory parameter strength and not speed; if this 
were true, then the results of the core model parameter estimates should match with the results of 
the latency parameter estimates.  However, we clearly do not see this in the data.  For targets for 
example, E is consistently smaller compared to the other memory processes for targets, but is the 
same speed or faster than the other memory processes.  Likewise, S2 is generally greater than the 
other memory processes for related distractors, but is the same speed or slower than the other 
memory processes.  The latency parameters and core parameters are measuring different things: 




EXPERIMENT 2 AND EXPERIMENT 3  
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Classic ideas surrounding dual-process accounts have an assumption that one of the 
defining differences between familiarity and recollection is that the former is faster than the 
latter.  However, studies in the RK literature as well as recognition studies with imposed 
deadlines and manipulations that affect recollection have failed to support this hypothesis 
(Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984; Dewhurst et al., 2006).  Despite this, the idea that familiarity is faster 
than recollection is appealing because it can explain why an inverted U function is observed for 
false alarms over time in recognition.  Fast familiarity, which supports false memory, produces 
the left arm of the curve, while a mixture of familiarity and slower recollection produces the 
right arm of the curve.   
While this explanation is logically sound, there are several weaknesses.  First, prior 
methods do not directly measure process speeds, and thus conclusions made from them are 
inferences at best.  Second, prior ideas regarding familiarity and recollection fall out of 
univariate accounts of recollection.  Recently, it has been suggested that recollection is bivariate 
with a separate process for target and context recollection (Brainerd et al., 2015).  In the case of 
the inverted U function, this can be explained by fast context recollection (which supports false 
memory), and slower familiarity and target recollection (which supports both false and true 
memories).  Third, inverted U functions on their own are not able to discriminate process speeds 
for list items, since they only use related distractors.  It may be the case that recollection and 
familiarity behave differently for list items than for related distractors, but this is impossible to 
discern using inverted U functions.  Last, inverted U functions may also be due to bias processes.  
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We may expect the same result if bias decreases as response time increases (Goethe & Oberauer, 
2008; Rotello & Heit, 1999).   
Latency extension models can address most of the weaknesses that have been discussed.  
Regarding the first point, latency extension models provide parameter outputs of response 
latencies, allowing them to be compared with statistical tests.  For the second point, a latency 
extension using a bivariate recollection model is simple to implement, and both Experiment 2 
and Experiment 3 took advantage of this with the conjoint recognition model.  With the extended 
conjoint recognition model, it was possible to compare relative speeds of familiarity and the two 
kinds of recollection.  Regarding the third point, because the conjoint recognition model provides 
parameter estimates of retrieval processes for both related and unrelated distractors as well as for 
list items, a latency extension of the conjoint recognition model can provide estimates of speeds 
from processes used for all types of cues, not just for related distractors.  Last, while the latency 
model itself could not answer if bias process speeds were responsible for the inverted U function, 
data from Experiment 3 was able to show that this was not the case. 
 The main objective of the last two experiments of this dissertation was to show how a 
new modeling methodology can provide insight into the speed of memory processes that could 
not previously be measured directly.  Before we can use the model to analyze memory processes, 
we must first ensure that real data could be fit to the model.  It did for both Experiments 2 and 3.  
In Experiment 2, the model fit four out of six datasets used in the experiment, and of the two that 
didn’t fit, fit failure could be attributed to large individual differences in subject responses.  
When individual differences were accounted for, overall model fits were acceptable for all 
datasets.  In Experiment 3, model fits for the latency extended model were acceptable in all 
conditions where the base model fit the data.   
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 There were two main goals for Experiment 2, and two main goals for Experiment 3 that 
followed up on some lingering questions that remained after Experiment 2.  For Experiment 2, 
the first goal was to see if a latency extension model could be applied to the conjoint recognition 
model, and fit to real data.  It could.  The second goal was to see if familiarity was faster than 
both target and context recollection, as per classic assumptions, or if context recollection was 
faster than familiarity.  Results from Experiment 2 showed that the latter was true: context 
recollection was significantly faster than familiarity.   
Experiment 3 addressed some concerns that may have remained after Experiment 2.  
First, it may be argued that while context recollection was faster than familiarity in an untimed 
condition, process speeds may be variable when response deadline manipulations are imposed.  
Therefore, it is possible that the model results from Experiment 2 are not sufficient to argue that 
context recollection is faster than familiarity under different experimental manipulations.  
Experiment 3 addressed this concern by implementing response deadlines in a conjoint 
recognition design, and then estimating process speeds for each deadline condition.  Despite the 
response deadline manipulation, the relative speed of memory processes were stable for all 
conditions, and consistent with findings from Experiment 2: phantom recollection was still faster 
than familiarity.  Second, parameter estimates of the core retrieval processes should match 
predictions from estimates of their latencies.  For example, if phantom recollection is fast, then 
values of phantom recollection should be greater at faster deadlines, thus contributing to elevated 
false alarms at earlier deadlines.  This was observed in Experiment 3.  I will discuss the findings 




Related Distractor Processes 
Retrieval processes from related distractors were of particular interest for Experiments 2 
and 3 because of prior research on false alarms used to infer process speeds.  Results from 
Experiment 2 challenged assumptions that familiarity was a faster process than recollection, and 
that recollection was a univariate process.  According to the latency extension model, phantom 
recollection was faster than familiarity in four out of six different datasets, and it was also faster 
than recollection rejection in five out of six different datasets.  Experiment 2 provided an initial 
evidence that phantom recollection, and not familiarity, was the fast process responsible for 
elevated false alarms at early deadlines, and also supported the bivariate, not univariate, 
conception of recollection, with the two different recollections operating at different speeds. 
 There may be concern that the latency modeling results from Experiment 2 were confined 
to the specific conditions that were used, and that it cannot be extended to studies using different 
manipulations, and especially those that manipulate response deadline.  Is it not possible that the 
relative order of retrieval processes changes if participants are timed, because it may change the 
way they approach the retrieval task?  Findings from Experiment 3 did not support this idea of 
process variance.  Experiment 3 replicated the results from Experiment 2, with phantom 
recollection generally being faster than the other retrieval processes.  This finding held true even 
with experiments using different response deadline conditions.  In addition, the results from the 
latency models were consistent across both experiments despite Experiment 3 using a slightly 
different base model than Experiment 2, where erroneous recollection rejection was included.  
This provides evidence that results of the latency extension model do not depend on deadline 
manipulations, and also that they are not affected by the separate binning procedures used for 
 84 
 
each deadline condition.  Therefore, we can use the modeling results to identify why the inverted 
U function is observed for false alarms over time. 
The inverted U function for false alarms to related distractors was observed in 
Experiment 3.  If it were the case that fast phantom recollection was the reason for the left arm of 
the curve, then it should follow that phantom recollection should be elevated at faster deadlines 
compared to other processes.  Indeed, results showed that phantom recollection was greater than 
the either familiarity or recollection rejection at the fastest deadline.  Also as hypothesized 
before, familiarity and recollection rejection increase over time, suggesting that a mix of the two 
contributes to the right arm of the inverted U function.  Recollection rejection in particular 
increased above phantom recollection after the 500ms deadline condition, which coincided with 
the dip in bias corrected levels of false memory.  In addition, the possibility that the inverted U 
function could be due to bias processes decreasing over time could be ruled out, because the 
curve was still present even after bias was accounted for with correction. 
Target Processes  
An advantage to latency extension models is that not only do they provide estimates for 
the relative speed of retrieval processes for related distractors, but they also provide estimates for 
the relative speed of retrieval processes for targets.  For related distractors, it was found that 
context (phantom) recollection was faster than familiarity and recollection rejection, a form of 
target recollection.  One important question is whether the relative speed of processes for targets 
is consistent with the relative speed of processes for related distractors.   
For targets, there is identity judgment (a mix of target and context recollection), 
familiarity, and erroneous recollection rejection (context recollection).  In both Experiment 2 and 
Experiment 3, there were no differences in speed between identity judgment and familiarity.  
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This is consistent with the findings from related distractor retrieval processes: if context 
recollection is faster than familiarity, and target recollection is not, then a process that represents 
the mix of the two types of recollection may average to be the same speed as familiarity.  In 
addition, context recollection for targets, E, could be measured in Experiment 3.  Similar to the 
behavior of phantom recollection for related distractors, E was either faster or the same speed as 
familiarity in the model analysis.  This lends support that P and E are tapping into the same type 
of recollection, and that context recollection is faster than familiarity. 
Comparisons With Other Methodologies 
Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 were able to demonstrate that a simple latency extension 
to an existing memory model could directly address some questions regarding memory process 
speeds that could not previously be answered.  Unlike prior theories that posited familiarity to be 
a fast retrieval process and recollection to be a slower, more effortful retrieval process, the 
results from these two experiments paint a more nuanced picture.  Familiarity was the same 
speed as target recollection, and significantly slower than context recollection.  This finding is 
consistent with findings from the RK literature, where “Know” responses were slower than 
“Remember” responses.  If familiarity were faster than recollection, then the expectation is that 
“Know” responses are also faster.  However, if context recollection were faster than familiarity 
and target recollection were the same speed, then it fits with the RK findings as “Remember” 
responses would be based on recollection of both target and contextual cues, and thus R 
responses will be the same speed or in some cases faster than K responses.  
 In addition, the present findings can provide an explanation for the results from the study 
by Gillund and Shiffrin (1884).  In their work, they used speeded recognition designs with 
manipulations that should affect recollection, with the anticipation that these manipulations 
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would have a greater effect on recollection at greater response intervals due to recollection being 
slower.  The manipulations, however, did not affect recollection.  In the present experiments, 
recollection (I) was the same speed as familiarity (S1) for targets: the lack of speed differences 
between recollection and familiarity for targets supports the null findings of recollection 
manipulations by speed in prior research.   
 The unique advantage of latency extension models that are absent in current methods is 
the fact that process speeds can be directly measured, rather than having to be inferred.  Even 
models that also incorporate time course of processes, such as Cox and Shiffrin’s (2017) 
dynamic model of memory, cannot do this.  In addition, the findings from Experiment 2 and 3 
are consistent with what was predicted by the dynamic model, suggesting that the two models are 
compatible with each other but also that the latency extended model provides additional 
information in the form of parameterized process speeds.   
 For example, the dynamic model does not assume that memory strength affects the 
temporal order of memory processes, but that they are fixed, and thus manipulations that affect 
the strength of memory traces do not change process order.  The same result was observed using 
the latency extension model; the order of memory processes did not change across different types 
of experimental manipulations, even though their strength changed across different response 
deadline conditions.  This is further evidenced by the fact that, for example, the parameter 
estimate of familiarity for related distractors, S2, was generally greater than the other processes P 
and R, but its latency parameter was generally slower than the other two processes. 
 Another hypothesis made by the dynamic model is that semantic content is accessed 
quickly compared to other types of memory traces, such as the modality of a word’s 
presentation.  This fits with the finding by the latency extension model that phantom recollection, 
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a process influenced by semantic gist, is faster than the other two processes.  With the case of the 
latency extension model, however, this conclusion could be made with statistically testable 
parameter estimates, rather than having to rely on inferences from experimental manipulations.   
Concluding Comments 
Before latency extension models, the relative speed of memory processes could only be 
inferred from response deadline studies.  By providing parameter estimates for process speeds, 
latency extension models allow researchers to directly measure them and compare them with 
statistical tests.  In the present experiments, I showed that a fast recollective process, and not 
familiarity, was responsible for the left arm of the inverted U shape curve: this was impossible to 
disentangle prior to the model being available.  This result is also consistent with findings from 
the RK literature, which conflicted with classic hypotheses that familiarity was faster than 
recollection.  It also provided additional support for bivariate models of recollection, as the speed 
for context recollection and target recollection were different from each other.  Last, like the 
dynamic model of memory, the latency extension model supports the hypothesis that process 
speeds are fixed, and provided quantifiable data to demonstrate this.  The latency extension 
model is a model that is easy to implement, and gives researchers a new tool to study the speed 






You have just seen 2 lists of vocabulary words. In the following test, you will be asked questions about 
the words you just saw. 
 
On this memory test, you will respond to 224 short questions about these lists.  Here is how the test 
works.  Each question begins with a word that may or may not be one of the words that you saw on one 
or both of the 2 lists.  The word is followed by 1 of 3 statements: 
• I saw it on List 1. 
• I saw it on List 2. 
• I saw it on List 1 OR List 2 
• I saw it on List 1 AND List 2. 
 
You respond to each question by telling us whether you think the statement about the word is correct.  
You either respond “yes” if you think that the statement is correct and “no” if you think that the statement 
is incorrect.  When you are asked if you saw the word on List 1, the correct answer is “yes” if it was on 
the first (yellow) list, and the answer is “no” otherwise.  When you are asked if you saw the word on List 
2, the correct answer is “yes” if it was on the second (white) list, and the answer is “no” otherwise.  When 
you are asked if you saw the word on either List 1 OR List 2, the correct answer is “yes” if it was 
presented in either List, and the answer is “no” if it was never presented. Last, when you are asked if you 
saw the word on List 1 AND List 2, the correct answer is “yes” if it was on both the first (yellow) list and 
the second (white) list, and the answer is “no” otherwise. 
 
The test will be presented on a computer screen, one word at a time. You will see the word and the 
question, and then you will hear a brief tone to indicate that you can submit a response.  When you think 
that the answer to a question is “yes,” press the left arrow key.  When you think that the answer to a 
question is “no,” press the right arrow key.  Please try your best to answer as accurately as possible for 
all questions, even if you are unsure of the answer. 
 
Now, let’s review a few examples of test questions so that you are clear about how to answer them.  Here 
are 8 sample questions and the correct answer for each: 
1. Screen:  It was on List 1.    Answer = Yes. 
2. Cloud:  It was on List 2.    Answer = Yes. 
3. Magician:  It was on List 1 OR List 2.   Answer = Yes. 
4. Satin:  It was on List 1 AND List 2.   Answer = Yes. 
5. Company:  It was on List 1.    Answer = No. 
6. Algebra:  It was on List 2.    Answer = No. 
7. Lawnmower:  It was on List 1 OR List 2.   Answer = No. 
8. Pope:  It was on List 1 AND List 2.   Answer = No. 
 
The correct answer to Questions 1 through 4 is “yes” because Screen appeared on the List 1 (the yellow 
list), Cloud appeared on List 2 (the white list), Magician was on List 1 (the yellow list), and Satin was on 
both lists.  The correct answer to Questions 5 through 8 is “no” because Company was on List 2 and not 
List 1, Algebra was not on either List, Lawnmower was not on either List, and Pope only appeared on List 
1 and not both. 
 
If you have any questions about these instructions, please ask them now.   
APPENDIX 
 




This is a memory experiment that involves 2 parts.  In the first part, you will view 2 lists of vocabulary words that 
will be presented as Power Point slides.  To keep the lists separate, the slides for the first list will be yellow and the 
slides for the second list will be white.  Pay close attention to the slides because there will be a memory test later.  
As each word comes up on the screen, read it silently to yourself. Between each list, you will also complete some 
simple math problems.  
 
The second part of the experiment is the memory test.   You will receive detailed instructions for the memory test 
when we get to it.  However, it is what we call a list identification test because your task will be to identify words 
that appeared on the first list versus words that appeared on the second list.  Do you have any questions? 
 
































You have just seen 2 lists of vocabulary words. In the following test, you will be asked questions about 
the words you just saw. 
 
On this memory test, you will respond to 224 short questions about these lists.  Here is how the test 
works.  Each question begins with a word that may or may not be one of the words that you saw on one 
or both of the 2 lists.  The word is followed by 1 of 3 statements: 
• I saw it on List 1. 
• I saw it on List 2. 
• I saw it on List 1 OR List 2 
• I saw it on List 1 AND List 2. 
 
You respond to each question by telling us whether you think the statement about the word is correct.  
You either respond “yes” if you think that the statement is correct and “no” if you think that the statement 
is incorrect.  When you are asked if you saw the word on List 1, the correct answer is “yes” if it was on 
the first (yellow) list, and the answer is “no” otherwise.  When you are asked if you saw the word on List 
2, the correct answer is “yes” if it was on the second (white) list, and the answer is “no” otherwise.  When 
you are asked if you saw the word on either List 1 OR List 2, the correct answer is “yes” if it was 
presented in either List, and the answer is “no” if it was never presented. Last, when you are asked if you 
saw the word on List 1 AND List 2, the correct answer is “yes” if it was on both the first (yellow) list and 
the second (white) list, and the answer is “no” otherwise. 
 
The test will be presented on a computer screen, one word at a time. You will see the word and the 
question, and then you will hear a brief tone to indicate that you can submit a response.  When you think 
that the answer to a question is “yes,” press the left arrow key.  When you think that the answer to a 
question is “no,” press the right arrow key.  Please try your best to answer as accurately as possible for 
all questions, even if you are unsure of the answer. 
 
Now, let’s review a few examples of test questions so that you are clear about how to answer them.  Here 
are 8 sample questions and the correct answer for each: 
1. Screen:  It was on List 1.    Answer = Yes. 
2. Cloud:  It was on List 2.    Answer = Yes. 
3. Magician:  It was on List 1 OR List 2.   Answer = Yes. 
4. Satin:  It was on List 1 AND List 2.   Answer = Yes. 
5. Company:  It was on List 1.    Answer = No. 
6. Algebra:  It was on List 2.    Answer = No. 
7. Lawnmower:  It was on List 1 OR List 2.   Answer = No. 
8. Pope:  It was on List 1 AND List 2.   Answer = No. 
 
The correct answer to Questions 1 through 4 is “yes” because Screen appeared on the List 1 (the yellow 
list), Cloud appeared on List 2 (the white list), Magician was on List 1 (the yellow list), and Satin was on 
both lists.  The correct answer to Questions 5 through 8 is “no” because Company was on List 2 and not 
List 1, Algebra was not on either List, Lawnmower was not on either List, and Pope only appeared on List 
1 and not both. 
 




















  List 1 List 2 
Buffer  Satin Satin 
  Kite Kite 
  Gasoline Gasoline 
  Pope Company 
  Magician Cloud 
  Screen Cork 
Categorized    
 Clothing Hat Shirt 
  Socks Underwear 
  Tie Suit 
  Girdle Vest 
 Birds Eagle Robin 
  Hummingbird Bluejay 
  Chicken Swallow 
  Starling Oriole 
 Color Yellow Blue 
  Violet Indigo 
  Gray Scarlet 
  Magenta Maroon 
 Animals (4-legged) Cat Horse 
  Elephant Tiger 
  Sheep Fox 
  Moose Zebra 
 Fruit Cherry Apple 
  Pineapple Strawberry 
  Lemon Fig 
  Nectarine Raspberry 
 Kitchen Utensil Knife Pot 
  Spatula Spoon 
  Cup Plate 
  Toaster Saucer 
 Instrument Drum Piano 
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  Saxophone Flute 
  Bass Horn 
  Piccolo Harmonica 
 Body Parts Leg Arm 
  Stomach Toe 
  Hair Shoulder 
  Lungs Ankle 
Uncategorized  Mallet Milk 
  Snow Rod 
  Wig Grasshopper 
  Clown Tea 
  Chalk Lamp 
  Phone Balloon 
  Snake Cement 
  Flag Macaroni 
  Ink Quilt 
  Pencil Pipe 
  Frost Clams 
  Pliers Pillow 
  Marijuana Manure 
  Roof Minnow 
  Shrimp Whale 
  Missile Cake 
  Gun Camera 
  Potato Bread 
  Necklace Rocket 
  Butter Casket 
  Tail Broom 
  Bandage Sugar 
  Key Vinegar 
  Carnation Crayons 
  Burro Sun 
  Sleigh Sand 
  Cancer Mountain 
  Beach Skyscraper 
  Trapeze Tornado 
  Blanket Lantern 
  Diapers Tennis 



















L1 Targets       
Categorized    Uncategorized   
 High Frequency L1? Leg High Frequency L1? Pencil 
   Knife   Tail 
   Socks   Wine 
   Violet   Flag 
  L2? Cat  L2? Key 
   Eagle   Ink 
   Pineapple   Beach 
   Saxophone   Blanket 
  L1U2? Drum  L1U2? Snow 
   Cherry   Snake 
   Stomach   Phone 
   Spatula   Frost 
  L1&2? Yellow  L1&2? Roof 
   Hat   Butter 
   Elephant   Cancer 
   Hummingbird   Gun 
 Low Frequency L1? Cup Low Frequency L1? Sleigh 
   Bass   Missile 
   Moose   Chalk 
   Magenta   Pliers 
  L2? Hair  L2? Wig 
   Lemon   Mallet 
   Starling   Trapeze 
   Girdle   Bandage 
  L1U2? Sheep  L1U2? Clown 
   Gray   Potato 
   Nectarine   Carnation 
   Toaster   Diapers 
  L1&2? Chicken  L1&2? Marijuana 
   Tie   Necklace 
   Piccolo   Burro 
   Lungs   Shrimp 
L2 Targets       
Categorized    Uncategorized   
 High Frequency L1? Horse High Frequency L1? Camera 
   Robin   Tennis 
   Strawberry   Lamp 
   Spoon   Mountain 
  L2? Blue  L2? Sun 
   Shirt   Rod 
   Flute   Cake 
   Toe   Sugar 
  L1U2? Apple  L1U2? Bread 
   Pot   Pillow 
   Tiger   Sand 
   Indigo   Tea 
  L1&2? Piano  L1&2? Pipe 
   Arm   Milk 
   Bluejay   Balloon 
   Underwear   Fur 
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 Low Frequency L1? Suit Low Frequency L1? Clams 
   Plate   Grasshopper 
   Vest   Cement 
   Maroon   Broom 
  L2? Fox  L2? Macaroni 
   Swallow   Casket 
   Raspberry   Skyscraper 
   Harmonica   Quilt 
  L1U2? Shoulder  L1U2? Vinegar 
   Fig   Manure 
   Oriole   Minnow 
   Zebra   Lantern 
  L1&2? Scarlet  L1&2? Rocket 
   Horn   Whale 
   Saucer   Crayons 
   Ankle   Tornado 
Related Distractors       
Categorized    Unrelated 
Categorized 
  
 High Frequency L1? Banana High Frequency L1? Iron 
   Green   Pine 
   Trumpet   Sofa 
   Crow   Platinum 
  L2? Fork  L2? Steel 
   Foot   Train 
   Rat   Truck 
   Shorts   Aluminum 
  L1U2? Guitar  L1U2? Desk 
   Dog   Chair 
   Purple   Maple 
   Ladle   Redwood 
  L1&2? Cardinal  L1&2? Oak 
   Jacket   Car 
   Elbow   Couch 
   Watermelon   Airplane 
 Low Frequency L1? Lavender Low Frequency L1? Cedar 
   Lime   Lead 
   Banjo   Helicopter 
   Squirrel   Alloy 
  L2? Harp  L2? Boat 
   Wolf   Willow 
   Strainer   Sycamore 
   Lungs   Bookcase 
  L1U2? Duck  L1U2? Brass 
   Stove   Chest 
   Vulture   Uranium 
   Apricot   Hickory 
  L1&2? Teeth  L1&2? Cab 
   Belt   Footstool 
   Chartreuse   Subway 
   Blouse   Bureau 
    Uncategorized   
    High Frequency L1? Mirror 
      Stick 
      Magazine 
      Straw 
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     L2? Jail 
      Paper 
      Needle 
      Button 
     L1U2? Hammer 
      Box 
      Rope 
      Rice 
     L1&2? Coffin 
      Grass 
      Mud 
      Basket 
    Low Frequency L1? Movie 
      Kerosene 
      Hatchet 
      Gym 
     L2? Volcano 
      Quill 
      Sponge 
      Thermometer 
     L1U2? Freckles 
      Pickle 
      Dentist 
      Chisel 
     L1&2? Sidewalk 
      Puddle 
      Typewriter 


































The experiment is divided into three independent study-test cycles.  In the study part of each cycle, which we will 
call the 'study phase', you will be presented with several word lists. They will be presented in an automated fashion.  
As each word comes up on the screen, read it silently to yourself and pay close attention to them, as your memory 
will be tested later on. 
 
After each study phase, your memory for the word lists will be tested.  We will call this the 'test phase'. You will 
receive detailed instructions about the memory test later on. 
 
Press ‘u’ when you understand the experiment structure. 
We will now begin the study phase. When you are ready, press “s” to begin. 
 
Test Instructions V Condition 
 
You will now take a recognition test. 
You will be shown a word that may be either:  
 
(a) a word that you saw in the previous study phase 
(b) a new word that is related to a word you saw in the previous study phase 
(c) a new word that is unrelated to the words you saw in the previous study phase 
 
For each word, your job is to respond ‘yes’ (press the "left arrow key") if the word was presented during the study 
phase, and ‘no’ (press the “right arrow key”) otherwise.  That is, you should respond ‘yes’ if the test item is from 
category (a) and ‘no’ if the test item is from category (b) or (c). 
 
Press ‘h’ to see an example of this. 
 
For example, suppose that during the study phase you saw the words “shuttle," "rocket," "astronaut," and "blank."  
On the test, if you are given the word “shuttle”, which was on the list, you should answer ‘yes’.  
However, if you are given the word “space”, which was not on the list but is related to a word that was presented, 
you should answer ‘no’. Similarly, if you are given the word “whale”, which was not on the list and is unrelated to 
any word that was presented, you should answer ‘no’. 
 
Press ‘x’ to learn about how much time you have to respond. 
 
Test Instructions G Condition 
 
You will now take a recognition test. 
You will be shown a word that may be either:  
 
(a) a word that you saw in the previous study phase 
(b) a new word that is related to a word you saw in the previous study phase 
(c) a new word that is unrelated to the words you saw in the previous study phase 
 
For each word, your job is to respond ‘yes’ (press the "left arrow key") if the word was not presented but RELATED 
to a word that was presented during the study phase, and ‘no’ (press the “right arrow key”) otherwise.  That is, you 
should respond ‘yes’ if the test item is from category (b) and ‘no’ if the test item is from category (a) or (c). 
 
Press ‘h’ to see an example of this. 
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For example, suppose that during the study phase you saw the words “shuttle," "rocket," "astronaut," and "blank."  
On the test, if you are given the word “shuttle”, which was on the list, you should answer ‘no’.  
However, if you are given the word “space”, which was not on the list but is related to a word that was presented, 
you should answer ‘yes’. Similarly, if you are given the word “whale”, which was not on the list and is unrelated to 
any word that was presented, you should answer ‘no’. 
 
Press ‘x’ to learn about how much time you have to respond. 
 
Test Instructions VG Condition 
 
You will now take a recognition test. 
You will be shown a word that may be either:  
 
(a) a word that you saw in the previous study phase 
(b) a new word that is related to a word you saw in the previous study phase 
(c) a new word that is unrelated to the words you saw in the previous study phase 
 
For each word, your job is to respond ‘yes’ (press the "left arrow key") if the word was presented or related to a 
word that was presented during the study phase, and ‘no’ (press the “right arrow key”) otherwise.  That is, you 
should respond ‘yes’ if the test item is from category (a) or (b) and ‘no’ if the test item is from category (c).  
 
Press ‘h’ to see an example of this. 
 
For example, suppose that during the study phase you saw the words “shuttle," "rocket," "astronaut," and "blank."  
On the test, if you are given the word “shuttle”, which was on the list, you should answer ‘yes’.  
If you are given the word “space”, which was not on the list but is related to a word that was presented, you should 
answer ‘yes’. However, if you are given the word “whale”, which was not on the list and is unrelated to any word 
that was presented, you should answer ‘no’. 
 
Press ‘x’ to learn about how much time you have to respond. 
 
Test Timing Instructions 
 
In addition, each test word will be displayed for LESS THAN 1 SEC., and will then be followed by a tone.  As soon 
as you hear the tone, you should provide a response (‘yes’ or ‘no’) as quickly as possible.  For this reason, you 
should think about your response BEFORE you hear the tone.   
 
Press ‘r’ for information on response feedback. 
 
Whenever you provide a response, your reaction time (RT) will be displayed soon afterwards.  If your response was 
too slow, the RT will appear in red, and you should try to be quicker next time.  If your response was not slow, the 
RT will appear in green, which means that you are providing a response within the appropriate time window. 
 
Press ‘s’ for some more tips on the timing of your response. 
 
You should always try to provide a response as soon as you hear the tone, but not before the tone. Responses made 
before the tone will not be recorded.  
 
Press ‘v’ to continue. 
 
Now let’s see how this works before you receive the actual memory test.  If you have any questions, please ask the 
researcher now. As before, suppose you were presented with the words “shuttle," "rocket," astronaut," "blank," 




Study List (Version 1) 
 
Study 1        
Critical Distractor Targets  Critical Distractor Targets  Critical Distractor Targets 
City New York  Mountain Climber  Chair Table 
 Urban   Hill   Rocking 
 Suburb   Climb   Swivel 
 County   Molehill   Recliner 
 Chicago   Peak   Seat 
 State   Valley   Stool 
 Capital    Summit   Desk 
 Country   Steep   Couch 
 Streets   Ski   Sit 
 Metropolitan   Bike   Sofa 
 Town   Goat   Bench 
 Village   Glacier   Sitting 
Slow Fast  Cup Saucer  Spider Web 
 Snail   Measuring   Tarantula 
 Turtle   Mug   Arachnid 
 Sluggish   Goblet   Creepy 
 Quick   Coaster   Bug 
 Molasses   Plastic   Insect 
 Lethargic   Tea   Crawl 
 Speed   Coffee   Fly 
 Delay   Straw   Fright 
 Hesitant   Handle   Poison 
 Cautious   Stein   Bite 
 Traffic   Drink   Animal 
Cold Hot  Soft Hard  Man Woman 
 Shiver   Loud   Lady 
 Arctic   Tender   Handsome 
 Frigid   Fluffy   Male 
 Freeze   Pillow   Person 
 Chilly   Downy   Suit 
 Frost   Plush   Uncle 
 Ice   Cotton   Beard 
 Warm   Skin   Muscle 
 Winter   Touch   Father 
 Snow   Fur   Old 
 Heat   Furry   Strong 
Pen Quill       
 Pencil       
 Bic       
 Marker       
 Write       
 Fountain       
 Felt       
 Scribble       
 Cross       
 Leak       
 Crayon       
 Tip       
Study 2        
Critical Distractor Targets  Critical Distractor Targets  Critical Distractor Targets 
Black White  Fruit Kiwi  Sweet Honey 
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 Gray   Citrus   Bitter 
 Brown   Pear   Sugar 
 Coal   Berry   Sour 
 Dark   Vegetable   Candy 
 Color   Banana   Tart 
 Funeral   Orange   Chocolate 
 Blue   Cherry   Nice 
 Charred   Apple   Taste 
 Ink   Ripe   Cake 
 Death   Basket   Tooth 
 Cat   Juice   Good 
Music Band  Rough Sandpaper  Smoke Cigar 
 Concert   Smooth   Cigarette 
 Jazz   Coarse   Pipe 
 Symphony   Tough   Tobacco 
 Orchestra   Rugged   Puff 
 Rhythm   Bumpy   Chimney 
 Radio   Jagged   Lungs 
 Melody   Riders   Pollution 
 Piano   Uneven   Billows 
 Sound   Ready   Ashes 
 Instrument   Sand   Fire 
 Note   Boards   Blaze 
Trash Garbage  Car Vehicle  Window Pane 
 Rubbish   Automobile   Sill 
 Debris   Garage   Shutter 
 Dump   Sedan   Curtain 
 Litter   Drive   Door 
 Landfill   Van   Ledge 
 Junk   Keys   Glass 
 Waste   Ford   View 
 Sewage   Truck   Screen 
 Pile   Bus   Open 
 Scraps   Jeep   Frame 
 Refuse   Taxi   Breeze 
King Throne       
 Queen       
 Crown       
 Reign       
 Monarch       
 Royal       
 Palace       
 Prince       
 Chess       
 Leader       
 Dictator       
 George       
Study 3        
Critical Distractor Targets  Critical Distractor Targets  Critical Distractor Targets 
Anger Rage  Sleep Nap  Shirt Blouse 
 Mad   Doze   Sleeves 
 Enrage   Awake   Collar 
 Fury   Drowsy   Shorts 
 Temper   Snooze   Button 
 Ire   Slumber   Pants 
 Wrath   Tired   Polo 
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 Mean   Rest   Jersey 
 Hatred   Snore   Vest 
 Fight   Wake   Cuffs 
 Hate   Yawn   Tie 
 Fear   Blanket   Pocket 
Smell Aroma  Lion Roar  Needle Thread 
 Scent   Tamer   Syringe 
 Whiff   Tiger   Haystack 
 Stench   Mane   Injection 
 Reek   Fierce   Pin 
 Sniff   Den   Thimble 
 Perfume   Cub   Sewing 
 Fragrance   Cage   Knitting 
 Nose   Bears   Prick 
 Rose   Jungle   Sharp 
 Salts   Pride   Thorn 
 Breathe   Africa   Point 
Doctor Physician  River Mississippi  Bread Rye 
 Nurse   Creek   Loaf 
 Stethoscope   Stream   Butter 
 Surgeon   Flow   Toast 
 Patient   Bridge   Dough 
 Clinic   Brook   Crust 
 Dentist   Lake   Flour 
 Medicine   Barge   Sandwich 
 Lawyer   Water   Jam 
 Health   Boat   Jelly 
 Sick   Swim   Slice 
 Cure   Run   Milk 
Foot Toe       
 Inch       
 Ankle       
 Shoe       
 Sandals       
 Sock       
 Hand       
 Boot       
 Yard       
 Kick       
 Knee       
 Walk       
Test List (Version 1) 
 
Test 1  
Targets Deadline 
(ms) 
 Related Distractors Deadline 
(ms) 
 Unrelated Distractors Deadline 
(ms) 
Sluggish 100  Chair 100  Deer 100 
Lady 300  Pen 100  Long 300 
Climb 300  Soft 100  Butterfly 300 
Urban 500  Cup 300  Lose 300 
Stool 750  Cold 300  Glasses 500 
Marker 750  Spider 300  Spaghetti 500 
Loud 750  Slow 500  Girl 500 
Measuring 1000  Man 750  Terrific 750 
Ice 1000  Mountain 750  Straight 1000 
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Creepy 1000  City 1000  Close 1000 
Test 2        
Targets Deadline 
(ms) 
 Related Distractors Deadline 
(ms) 
 Unrelated Distractors Deadline 
(ms) 
Reign 100  Black 100  Drug 100 
Symphony 100  Fruit 100  Factory 100 
Shutter 100  King 500  Trouble 300 
Keys 300  Window 500  Shy 300 
Rubbish 300  Music 500  Wish 750 
Tobacco 300  Car 750  Whiskey 750 
Candy 500  Smoke 750  Mutton 750 
Coarse 500  Trash 750  High 1000 
Grey 750  Rough 1000  Atom 1000 
Pear 750  Sweet 1000  Church 1000 
Test 3        
Targets Deadline 
(ms) 
 Related Distractors Deadline 
(ms) 
 Unrelated Distractors Deadline 
(ms) 
Toast 100  Smell 100  Justice 100 
Wake 100  Lion 300  Plan 100 
Shoe 300  Needle 300  Portrait 100 
Mad 500  Shirt 300  Rubber 300 
Patient 500  Bread 500  Cabbage 500 
Stream 500  Sleep 500  Ghost 500 
Fragrance 750  Foot 750  Lamp 500 
Injection 1000  Anger 1000  Command 750 
Sleeves 1000  Doctor 1000  Thief 750 
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